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Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate
Lama Abu-Odeht
INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that if we wish to account for the limited gains made in
the area of family law reform in Egypt in the twentieth century, it is crucial to
relate the debate on family law with another debate, one revolving around the
identity of the Egyptian legal system.' Whereas the dispute over family law
reform forced decisions on gender and the family, the contest surrounding
identity centered on the ongoing and agonized struggle by Egyptians to define
the nature of their country's contemporary cultural identity.2 The question of
identity was often framed as a debate over the "character" of Egyptian law,
asking: Should law in Egypt be reconstructed to re-acquire its lost Islamic
identity, or should it remain European and secular?
3
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Many friends and colleagues have
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acknowledge the assistance of Janet Halley, David Luban, Mark Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, Hani Sayed,
Michael Siedman and Milton Regan. I would also like to thank my research assistant Parastoo Anita
Mesri. Her invaluable edits, insightful comments and diligent research made this paper possible.
1. See infra Part A & B. In the nineteenth century, the Egyptian legal system moved closer to
European law with the passage of European-inspired civil, penal, commercial and maritime laws.
However, personal status law "remained wholly unreformed until 1920." TAHIR MAHMOOD, STATUTES
OF PERSONAL LAW IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: HISTORY, TEXTS, AND ANALYSIS 10 (rev. 2d ed. 1995).
The Laws on Personal Status passed between 1920 and 1929 continued to engage in religious rules,
rather than drawing from European civil law. Id. at 11. "The two Laws on Personal Status 1920-1929,
as re-amended in 1985, constitute the present Egyptian code of family law." Id. at 14.
2. See infra Section B.2. These issues are of course not unique to Egypt or even to Mbslim-
majority countries. It is not entirely uncommon for a nation to have an official or state religion, the
recognition of which is an integral part of its cultural identity and which may cause continual debate and
reflection. Although only a handful of Muslim-majority countries have the word "Islamic" in their
official names, Egypt is one of at least fifteen that recognize Islam as their "state religion." See
MAHMOOD, supra note 1, at 1.
3. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, during the Nasser regime in Egypt, there was a battle (that
continues to the present day) between the so-called "Islamists," those who advocated a return to the rule
of Islamic law (shari "ah) and the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt, and those who wished to
continue a secular path of development and "modernization," as Nasser's plan of pan-Arabism and
socialism contemplated. Professor John Esposito discusses this tension:
Domestically, Nasser faced the disruptive challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic
movement that rejected the Western secular path of modem Egypt and advocated a return to
Islam and the Shariah in charting Egypt's future .... [Tihe Brotherhood felt alienated from
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The debate on the nature of Egypt's cultural identity hinged on law,4
specifically the question of the origin of law, due to the fact that the
transplantation of the (secular) European civil law system onto Egypt, over the
course of a century and a half, had the effect of displacing Egypt's historic
(religious) legal system based on Islamic law.5 The only exception to this
phenomenon of transplantation was family law; although it was formally
codified in a Western legal fashion, the substantive rules governing the family
preserved their Islamic origins. 6 This arrangement had the effect of rendering
the Egyptian legal system into a predominantly secular system with the
exception of family law, understood to be derived from religious law.7  The
Nasser when it became clear that he was not going to join with them in the creation of an
Islamic state.
JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM AND POLITICS 133 (4th ed. 1998).
4. Law has consistently been central to the debate about cultural identity in the majority of the
Islamic world. As Professor Esposito reports, "[a]s a result of nineteenth-century government reform,
the traditional Islamic basis of Muslim states was altered by a progressive secularization of society in
which the ideology, law, and institutions of state were no longer Islamically legitimated but were
indebted to imported models from the West." Id. at 47. Thus, "Muslims found themselves between two
norms: the traditionalist belief that religion ought to determine the nature of political organization and
that Islamic law provided the necessary standard and guidance for society, and the secular ....
preference for Western political concepts and institutions." Id. at 53. Therefore, Professor Esposito
notes that "[a]lthough there are distinctive differences" among those calling for an Islamic revival,
reform, or renaissance throughout the Islamic world, "they share both a common Islamic heritage and
confrontation with Westem political and cultural imperialism." Id. at 160. "Common themes" among
their political and sociopolitical thought include "a call for the reintroduction of Shariah law as the sine
qua non for establishing a more Islamic state and society." Id. at 161. It is outside the scope of this
paper to discuss specific country examples, but the reader can look at the case of Libya, for instance. See
id. at 161-171.
5. See MARGOT BADRAN, FEMINISTS, ISLAM, AND NATION: GENDER AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN EGYPT 124,181 (1995) (referring to "adoption in the nineteenth century of secular commercial
and civil law, based on French model .... ).
6. See Margot Badran, Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and
Twentieth-Century Egypt in WOMEN, ISLAM AND THE STATE 201, 201 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991). The
author reports that, "[tihe former broad purview of the religious establishment was eroded piecemeal in
the drive towards secularisation of education and law. The only exception to this was the sphere of
personal status laws." Id. In addition, Badran has noted that, "[i]n the realm of law there was a
secularization of commercial, civil, and criminal codes leaving only ahwal shakhsiyah, or personal
status law (also called family law), under the jurisdiction of Islam. Christians had their own separate
personal status code .... " BADRAN, supra note 5, at 10. Professor John Esposito also refers to the
process that took place in the nineteenth century by which "Islamic law and courts were restricted to
family law (marriage, divorce, inheritance) as the state adopted new legal codes based on French
prototypes, which were applied by civil courts." ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 47.
7. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 10. As the author notes, "Egyptians were at once members of a
religious community (ummah) and citizens of a secular nation-state (watan), albeit one in which Islam
was the official religion." Id. Badran does a sophisticated analysis of this phenomenon and its
intersection with patriarchy:
Patriarchal domination remained most entrenched in the family, with modes of control over
women varying according to class and circumstances... With the erosion of the instrumental
hold of males inside the patriarchal family over 'their' women as the nineteenth century
progressed-a corollary of 'modernization' of state and society-the personal status laws, or
family laws, became a last bastion of control over women. The patriarchal family would not
relinquish this control, nor would the state exact it. *Having removed all other areas of law
from the jurisdiction of Islam, the state had left Muslim religious authorities in control of
Islamic personal status laws.
Id. at 124.
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historic process of the displacement of the local (the Islamic) by the outsider
(the European) in the field of law came to symbolize, in a condensed form, the
more generalized phenomenon of cultural "displacement" that Egypt
8
experienced with the rise of European modernity and colonial advancement. 9
Specifically, I argue that mainstream Egyptian feminists' attempts to
reform family law (incorporating such concepts as consent, autonomy, and
formal equality between the genders) were to a large degree undercut by the
constraints created by the debate on the identity of the Egyptian legal system.' 0
Liberal feminism was consistently compromised so that the relative autonomy
of religious law manifest in family law" could be maintained, allowing the
secular nature of the rest of the legal system to be preserved.12 This position, in
which liberal feminism was compromised to create an intricately balanced
secular/religious space in the legal system, was forced upon feminists by the
allies they sought to help pass specific micro reforms in family law throughout
the twentieth century.13 Those allies included the liberal enlightened ulama, or
religious scholars, of Egypt and the secular nationalist elites who controlled the
legislature and the judiciary. 14  The adversary of this alliance was the
conservative ulama and the religious right. 15
8. The same was and is true of the rest of the Islamic world.
9. See ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 47.
As a result of nineteenth-century government reform, the traditional Islamic basis of Muslim
states was altered by a progressive secularization of society in which the ideology, law, and
institutions of state were no longer Islamically legitimated but were indebted to imported
models from the West .... The process of modernization also contributed to the erosion of
the traditional bases for the power and prestige of the religious establishment as new classes
of professionals assumed positions in education, law, and government, positions which had
previously been the province of the ulama [religious scholars].
Id. The cultural displacement that occurred in Egypt as well as most other Muslim-majority countries
went hand in hand with the European projects of colonialism and domination, which assumed an
Orientalist view and notion of the East. As the late Edward Said wrote,
[a]long with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and
retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological
determinism and moral-political admonishment. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they
were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or
confined or-as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory--taken over. The point is
that the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative
judgment, and in the case of the peoples inhabiting the decayed Ottoman Empire, an implicit
program of action. Since the Oriental was a member of a subject race, he had to be
subjected: it was that simple.
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 207 (1979).
10. See infra Parts B & C. On this point, is it instructive to look at Azza M. Karam's analysis of
the opposition to family law reforms brought about by Jihan's Law, passed in the 1970s and declared
unconstitutional in 1985. Karam reports that, "the Islamization of discourse was the principal factor in
the search for legitimacy and authenticity, which was and is plaguing the Egyptian polity." AZZA M.
KARAM, WOMEN, ISLAMISMS AND THE STATE 2 (1998).
11. See supra notes 1,6-7 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Parts A & C.
13. See infra Parts B & C.
14. See, e.g., MAHMOOD, supra note 1, at 10. Mahmood noted that
[a]t the turn of the [twentieth] century the views on law reform expressed by some Egyptian
jurists and scholars-e.g., Shaikh Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Rida and Mustafa al-
Maraghi-revolutionized the social and legal thinking in the country. Jurists of Al-Azhar
University sat down to suggest reforms in the prevailing practices related to marriage and
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I argue that there are signs of a new alliance emerging in the attempt to
avoid the trap of the compromise detailed above.16 Instead of sacrificing liberal
feminism for the sake of preserving a secular legal space, this new alliance
argues for a full-fledged liberal feminism, one that is located in Islamic texts,
and an agenda to Islamicize the rest of the legal system (albeit in a liberal
fashion). 17 This emergent alliance consists of a new strand within Egyptian
feminism as well as a liberal, modernizing, Islamicizing male elite.'" In the
new alliance, secularism is sacrificed for liberal feminism.19
In Part A of this Article, I present family law reform and identity of the
legal system as two closely linked topics that have occupied the time and
energies of various groups of elite and intelligentsia in modem Egypt. In Part
B, I describe the competing positions in the debates over the two issues. My
analysis demonstrates the high level of ideological complexity and degree of
entanglement that exists between these two debates. I discuss the specific ways
in which Egyptian feminists, participants in the family law reform debate, fird
themselves trapped in and hostage to the way the debate on identity has been
formulated in Egypt.
In Part C, I discuss the terms of the compromise on the question of women
produced by this entanglement between two debates, and the nature of the
alliance involved in this compromise. I begin Part D by offering a description
of an emergent alliance that advocates liberal family law reform in Egypt while
also promoting the Islamicization of the rest of the legal system. I describe
how this new alliance presents its reform agenda in an attempt to avoid being
undercut by the debate on identity, as has historically been the case in Egypt.
Finally, in Part E, I conclude the Article by providing my critique of this new
alliance.
divorce. Several committees of jurists were constituted one after another to discuss and
recommend the necessary reforms.
Id.
15. Professors John L. Esposito and John 0. Voll of Georgetown report,
[t]he majority of the ulama in most Muslim societies emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth
century as a declining conservative force. The educational institutions under their control
lost resources, students, and influence and in many places were simply taken over by the
states, which were increasingly dominated by secularist modernizers .... The basic fact
about the role of the 'traditional' ulama in the modem world is "that the 'ulama [sic] as a
group lost their position as an uncontested intellectual elite in the Arab world," and this is
true elsewhere as well. Except "for a few bold spirits ... the 'ulama' responded to the
challenge of modernity by withdrawing into a defensive conservatism" at the same time that
the modernizing secular intellectuals were emerging as a major force.
John L. Esposito & John 0. Voll, Introduction to MAKERS OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAM 15 (John L.
Esposito & John 0. Voll eds., 2001) (quoting MENAHAM MILSON, MEDICAL AND MODERN
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION IN THE ARAB WORLD 24 (1972)).
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A. Gender and Identity: the Family Drama
The twin debates on gender and the identity of the Egyptian legal system
have occupied Egyptian elites and intelligentsia for the past hundred years,
dividing them into several social and political forces. Mainstream Egyptian
feminism is one such social force, and its destiny has been intricately related to
the way these twin struggles have unfolded.20
Among the key questions related to gender that have been posed in Egypt
in the last one hundred years are those that involve, and are related to, law.21
Egyptian elites have pondered the kind of gendered family relationship the law
should regulate. Thus, Egyptian elites have contemplated whether the law
should, for instance, conceive of men and women as equal, meaning the same;
equal but different; or unequal because different.
22
On the issue of the identity of the legal system, the main question that has
occupied the Egyptian elite over the past century is whether it is acceptable for
laws to be derived from Islam or from secular, European sources (as is the case
in most of the post-colonial Islamic world) in Egypt, a country that identifies
itself as Muslim. 23 Since the contemporary legal system in Egypt is a European
24transplant, the answer to this question seems to be conceptually related to
another issue, namely, how Egyptians should conceive of the relationship of the
West to the Muslim East. This relationship can be seen as one of
20. See BADRAN, supra note 5.
21. For example, Margot Badran identifies several major issues focused on by feminists, such as
those who comprised the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in the first half of the last century. All of the
issues are related to law, specifically, Islamic personal status law, including a minimum marriage age;
polygamy; divorce; obedience; and maternal child custody. BADRAN, supra note 5, at 124-135.
22. This gendered relationship is generally understood in terms of religion; thus, Badran reports
that consistently in Egypt, "[a]ccording to the conventional interpretation of Islam, and of Christianity,
wives were under the authority of husbands." BADRAN, supra note 5, at 124. This understanding was
not limited to men or non-activist women; even feminists "adhered to the mainstream view that
women's and men's family roles and relations were ordained by religion." Id. at 125. Badran notes
that, in the first part of the twentieth century, "[t]he Egyptian feminists' critique of family law was
moderate, if not conservative .... Feminists accepted different gender roles in the family but insisted on
equality in difference." Id.
23. The fact that the elite have pondered this question does not reflect a trend or pattern in the
population as a whole; indeed, one may assert that a majority of Muslim Egyptians never gave their
consent to, nor supported or desired, a secularization of law and institutions. As Professor Esposito
reports,
[d]espite the century-long commitment of Egyptian leaders to modernization, reforms
imposed from above did not guarantee their acceptance by the vast majority of the people.
The orientation of the state-its institutions, laws, and policies-revealed more about the
ideals and goals of Egyptian rulers than about the realities of Egyptian society. Modem elites
constituted a small fraction of an otherwise tradition-oriented majority.
EsPOSITO, supra note 3, at 135.
24. Esposito reports that in nineteenth century Egypt, "Islamic law had been displaced by
European-based civil and criminal codes," though "Muslim family law ... remained intact." Id. at 60.
See also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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(fundamental) difference, incorporation (of the West), or resistance (to the
25power of the West).
Issues related to gender and identity divide the Egyptian intelligentsia
along a political spectrum of left, center, and right. One may occupy a certain
political position on one issue and a diametrically opposite one on the other.
For instance, to be a centrist on the question of family law reform by no means
implies that one is also a centrist on the question of the identity of the legal
system.
26
B. Mapping the Siblings: Varying Positions in the Twin Debates on Gender and
the Identity of the Egyptian Legal System
1. Gender and Family Law Reform
On the question of family law reform, one may categorize the positions
taken by the Egyptian elite into right, center and left. The rightist position is
based on the belief that transactional reciprocity in the family is the ideal, and
can be reduced essentially to the maxim, "husbands maintain and wives obey."
This maxim originates in medieval Islamic jurisprudence 27 and is variously
28formulated in family codes throughout the Islamic world today. These
25. Here one can again see the difference between the discourse of the governing elite and that of
Islamists and other popular groups:
For the religiously oriented, the problem had always been clear-departure from the straight
path of Islam was doomed to failure. For Western-oriented intellectuals and elites, the
disillusionment was more unsettling. They had embraced the West as both an ally and a
model for modem development .... [F]ailures of Muslim governments posed a direct
challenge to those Muslims who had espoused Western-oriented positions.
ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 159.
26. My characterization of the positions taken on gender and family law reform and the identity of
the legal system as "right," "left," and "center," is meant to be understood according to my descriptions,
below, of the Egyptian political system, as well as the classic notions of the right, center and left that are
familiar in other contexts. By "right," I mean forces signified by social conservatism as well as support
for a free market with some allowance for the poor, best represented by the jurists inhabiting the most
famous Islamic institution in Egypt: Al-Azhar. See generally MALIKA ZEGHAL, GARDIENS DE L'ISLAM:
LES OULEMAS D'AL AZHAR DANS L"EGYPTE CONTEMPORAINE (THE GUARDIANS OF ISLAM: THE
ULEMA OF AL-AZHAR IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT (1996). The center in Egypt typically supports
democracy and human rights and a regulated market. The best political party to represent this position
would be AI-Wafd. See generally MRius DEEB, PARTY POLITICS IN EGYPT: THE WAFD & ITS RIVALS,
1919-1939 (1979). The left on the other hand, is preoccupied with colonial and imperial powers and
opposes all forms of coercive, explicit or implicit, intervention in the affairs of the third world. As for its
attitude towards the market, it generally supports a large welfare state, an example being the legacy of
Jamal Abdel Nasser (President of Egypt 1952-1970). See RAM GINAT, EGYPT'S INCOMPLETE
REVOLUTION: LUTFI AL-KHULI AND NASSER'S SOCIALISM IN THE 1960S (1997)
27. Professor Esposito reports that under classical Islamic Law, the husband is obliged to pay his
wife her maintenance (nafaqah) "unless she refuses him conjugal rights or is otherwise disobedient."
JOHH L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 25 (2d ed. 2001).
28. Article I of Egyptian Law No. 100 (1985) provides one such example. Under this law,
maintenance of the wife is the obligation of the husband; wives are entitled to this maintenance from the
date of the marriage contract. See DAWOUD SUDQI EL ALAMI & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC
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formulations vary in their precise content along a political spectrum of liberal
to conservative, depending on how each code defines the wife's duty of
obedience (the less "obedience" it involves, the more liberal the code) and the
husband's duty of maintenance (the more financial obligations it prescribes, the
more liberal the code).29  The ulama and the conservative religious
intelligentsia in Egypt typically advocate an understanding of the maxim that is
30
more conservative than liberal. One columnist claimed there was a
difference between women's freedom and women's liberation. Islam
gives women many rights, and more freedom and respect. But it does
not recognise the wave of liberation which some ladies are calling for.
Islam protects the Muslim woman who is decent and who respects her
home, her husband and children. Islam does not give rights to the
woman who rebels and who is nashez [who leaves her husband's
house and refuses to return]. 3'
Another rightist position is encompassed by "Islamist Feminism," the
strand of feminism that upholds transactional reciprocity (husbands maintain
and wives obey) as the basis of healthy gender relations, provided that men
pursue both their powers over women and their responsibilities towards them
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE ARAB WORLD 52 (1996). Under the dictates of the Article,
"[m]aintenance shall comprise food, clothing, accommodation, the cost of medical treatment and
anything else prescribed by the Shari'a." Id. The wife is entitled to her maintenance once she legally (if
not actually) "submits" herself to her husband. See id. Article I provides that, with certain exceptions,
the wife loses her maintenance if she leaves the house without her husband's permission, or works
against his wishes. See id. at 52-53. More directly, Article 1 lb(2) establishes that, "[i]f the wife refuses
to show obedience (ta 'a) to the husband, without lawful justification, her maintenance (nafaqa) shall be
suspended from the date of refusal." Dawoud S. El Alami, Law No. 100 of 1985: Amending Certain
Provisions of Egypt's Personal Status Laws, I ISLAMIC L. & SOCY'Y 116, 119 (1994).
29. For instance, under Article 23 of the Tunisian Majallah (Code), seen as the most liberal in the
Arab world, the husband is the "head of the family" and he is responsible for the maintenance of wife
and children. See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 28, at 243. However, the Tunisian Majallah is
unique because it mandates that the wife must contribute to the maintenance of the family if she has
money, see id., and is not obligated to obey her husband, see Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom:
Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 11-12 (1997).
30. For a discussion of the reaction of the conservative ulama and religious intelligentsia to Jihan's
Law, which improved the personal status laws that had been in place since the 1920s, and which was
repealed on technical grounds (much to the delight of these groups) by the Supreme Constitutional Court
in 1985, see NADIA HAB, WOMANPOWER: THE ARAB DEBATE ON WOMEN AT WORK 29-35 (1988). As
the author reports,
no sooner was [Jihan's Law] passed than the sniping began. Some people attempted to have
it repealed on the grounds that it contravened the Sharia, since Sadat made the Sharia the
main source of law in a constitution passed in the early 1980s. They failed to have the Law
repealed on these grounds because it had been passed before the new constitution had come
into effect.
Finally, in 1985, the very constitutionality of the Law was challenged. Sadat had used
his presidential privilege to pass Law No. 44 by decree shortly before parliament reconvened,
presumably to avoid the kind of debate that would arouse religious emotion.
Id. at 31. In the debates ensuing at the time, one editorial in an Egyptian newspaper, AL-AHALI,
condemned the .'attacks by reactionary circles, and those whom they call men of religion-although
there are no priests in Islam."' Id. at 32 (quoting AL-AHALI, May 15, 1985).
31. HIJAB, supra note 30, at 33. (quoting AL GUMHOURIYA, May 18, 1985).
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conscientiously and consistent with God's commands.3 2 The danger, according
to this line of thought, lies not in the formal inequality structure implicit in this
arrangement, as liberal mainstream Egyptian feminists claim, but in men's
abuse of their religiously based powers and responsibilities. Equally important
to this position is the belief that danger is created when a woman tries to
"cross-over" to the man's world to assume powers and responsibilities that are
rightly his.
In the opinion of Islamist feminists, women are oppressed precisely
because they try to be "equal" to men and are therefore being placed in
unnatural settings and unfair situations, which denigrate them and take
away their integrity and dignity as women. For example, women are
"forced" to go out and compete in the labour market-a task which
means that women may come into contact with men (as in public
transport, for example) in a humiliating and inappropriate way.
The centrist position on the question of family law reform is divided into
two sub-positions adopted by two distinct social/political forces in Egypt. The
first position advocates splitting the difference between the demands of the
religious right and those of mainstream feminists demanding equality. The
national secular male elites of Egypt have historically pursued this strategy,
both in legislation and in adjudication.34 The Supreme Constitutional Court
(SCC) of Egypt, in particular, is committed to this strategy. 35 Examples of such
"splitting" in the decisions of the SCC include narrowly restricting polygamy
(rather than abolishing it); 36 banning the veil, while affirming modesty;37 and
32. The modem Islamist feminist movement is described by one author as being comprised of
women who "are aware of a particular oppression of women, and they actively seek to rectify this
oppression by recourse to Islamic principles." KAR.AM, supra note 10, at 9 (emphasis in original).
33. KARAM, supra note 10, at 10.
34. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt,2004 OXFORD U.
COMp. L. F. 3 §§ II(D), IV(C), at http://ouclf.iuscop.org/articles/abu-odeh.shtml.
35. See id. at § IV(C). For a description of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, see Marie-
Claire Foblets & Baudouin Dupret, Contrasted Identity Claims Before Egyptian and Belgian Courts, in
LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 57, 63 (Bandouin Dupret et. al. eds., 1999). The Supreme
Constitutional Court is "competent in issues with regard to the interpretation of the law, monitoring
constitutional issues and deciding conflicts of competence between the courts. At the request ofajudge
it can be called upon to decide on the constitutional status of a law." Id. One author has recognized the
"crucial role of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in determining the nature of public life in
Egypt as a modem state formally governed by principles of Islamic Shari'a laws." Ran Hirschl,
Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 191,
197 (2002). Hirschl also notes that the court has a relatively wide authority of judicial review over
presidential and administrative powers and has largely retained a high degree of independence. Ran
Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment Through
Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J INT'L L. 73, 114 (2000).
36. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 34, § IV(C).
37. For a discussion of the veil case, see Scott Kent Brown II, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A
Comment on Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1049,
1089. See also Kilian Bdlz, The Secular Reconstruction of Islamic Law: The Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court and the "Battle over the Veil" in State-Run Schools, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE
[Vol. 16:145
2004] Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate
restricting no-fault divorce by men, rather than giving an equal right to such
divorce to women.38
The second centrist position in the debate on family law reform promotes a
liberal feminism that is based on a particular arrangement of legal concepts
(equality, autonomy and consent) unique to liberal feminism as understood in
the West.39 Egyptian feminism over the past seventy years or so has been
committed to this discursive structure.40
Finally, the leftist position on the question of gender and family law reform
is one of liberal feminism. I have found no concrete examples of advocates of
"radical feminism" (understood as a radical critique of the tenets of equality,
consent and autonomy implicit in liberal feminism) in Egypt.41 There is,
however, a feminism of the left, a liberal feminism that relies heavily on the
ARAB WORLD 229, 238-242 (Baudouin Dupret et. al. eds., 1999); Clark Benner Lombardi, Islamic Law
as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab
State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 106-113 (1998); Awad Mohammed El-Mor, Judicial Sources
for Supporting the Protection of Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 5, 14-19 (1997). Chief Justice Morr concluded that "[w]omen under Islamic law have
no definitive requirement for their dress." Id. at 16. Thus, the SCC did not find the hijab (head.scarf) or
niqab (veil that covers the face as well as the hair) to be required by the shari'ah. However, Chief
Justice Mort asserted that the
core objectives or Islamic norms and rules-in so for as restrictions on women's dress are
concerned-are to help women reach their full potential, free from animal pleasures and
sensations, and to mandate a pattern of behavior repulsive of both debasement and
arrogance .... [A] balance must be struck between the necessities of life, the application of
valid customs and traditions, and the requirement that her dress not reveal the fascinations of
her body.
Id. at 16-17. The court concluded that "women have to yield to moderation in their dress .... [T]he
dress of women must neither disclose nor describe their feminine features so that they are not seductive
or intruded upon as a result of their appearance." Id. at 17.
38. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 34, at § IV(C).
39. See generally BADRAN, supra note 5, at 124-141. For instance, the battle waged in the early
part of the twentieth century by the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) to establish a minimum age for
marriage addressed the issue of consent. See id. at 127-128. The fight to restrict institutions that
enforced obedience (of the wife towards the husband) was waged well into the 1960s, when bayt al-
Ta 'ah ("house of obedience") was finally abolished, but the struggle for autonomy and equality
continues to the present day. See id. at 131-132. For a very good discussion of bayt al-Ta 'ah and its
eventual abolition in 1967, see Fauzi M. Najjar, Egypt's Laws of Personal Status, 10 ARAB STUD. Q.
319, 331-332 (1988).
40. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 124-141.
41. One author describes radical feminism in the following passage:
[D]ismissing all existing human rights enforcement structures, radical feminists reject the
liberal affinity with the individual and argue that women are oppressed as a class. The focus
of radical feminists is on power. They see no value in any existing structure for enforcement
of rights, because it can be deconstructed and exposed as a shell of male bias. This
deconstruction leaves nothing remaining but a struggle for power. Whereas strict cultural
relativists deconstruct all systems and walk away, radical feminists fill the void with power.
Kimberly Younce Schooley, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, And Human Rights - Toward A
Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 651, 700-701 (1994). In addition, Ms. Bond of
Georgetown University Law Center reports:
[R]adical feminists argue that the dominance of patriarchy and the subordination of women is
the defining characteristic in the construction of gender for all women. Although radical
feminists differ on the manifestations of that dominance, most would agree that subverting
the patriarchy will require a dramatic reorganization of power within institutional structures
and individual relationships.
Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical And Pragmatic Exploration Of
Women's International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 105 (2003).
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secular discourse of rights as both constitution-based and as derived from the
principal UN human rights instruments. 2
Secular feminists firmly believe in grounding their discourse outside
the realm of any religion, whether Muslim or Christian, and placing it,
instead, within the international human rights discourse. They do not
'waste their time' attempting to harmonize religious discourses with
the concept and declarations pertinent to human rights. To them,
religion is respected as a private matter for each individual, but it is
totally rejected as a basis from which to formulate any agenda on
43
women's emancipation.
To a great extent the leftist and the centrist positions on the question of
gender and family law reform are indistinguishable. However, one element
that at times differentiates the liberal feminism of the left from that of the
center is leftist women's insistence that women's struggles are inseparable from
other struggles in society.44 For instance, the New Woman Research Centre, an
Egyptian non-governmental organization established in 1984, describes its
mission in the following way: "The Center seeks to articulate an Arab and
feminist vision of the social causes in general and of women's causes in
particular ....
The person who comes closest to advocating radical feminism in Egypt is
the famous feminist Nawal Saadawi.46 She can be described as a radical
42. The "International Bill of Rights" is comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Pights
and the two covenants-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 73
(1999).
43. KARAM, supra note 10, at 13. What I call "the liberal feminism of the left," which is self-
consciously secular but also espouses an agenda of women's rights that is reminiscent of the liberal
feminism of the center, Azza Karam calls "Secular Feminism."
44. See, e.g., KARAM, supra note 10, at 127-128. The author's interview with Ayida SaifAl-Dawla
of the New Woman Research Centre (NWRC) is instructive. Speaking of future challenges facing
Egyptian women, Saif AI-Dawla did not consider the women's struggle in isolation, but in light of other
societal struggles, primarily "poverty and what will come of it." Id. at 127. She spoke of her belief that,
"structural adjustment policies will leave society in turmoil. This will ... create fertile grounds for
'Islamist terrorism, non-Islamist terrorism and state terrorism."' Id. In addition, Karam reports that
"[i]n line with her ideas on 'state terrorism', SaifAl-Dawla emphasizes that democracy (or the lack of it)
is the immediate challenge facing Egyptian women's groups." Id. at 128.
45. NEW WOMAN RESEARCH CENTRE, FEMINISM AND IDENTITY cover (2002) (on file with author).
For a discussion of the New Woman Research Centre, its origins and its activities, see KARAM, supra
note 10, at 123-128.
46. As one author reports, "[n]ot until 1982 was an organized secular feminist association, the Arab
Women's Solidarity Association, born. This group, led by Nawal Saadawi, was itself a radicalization of
the early secularist movement, which never broached the subject of women's sexuality and individual
freedom." GHADA HASHEM TALHAMI, THE MOBILIZATION OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN EGYPT 82 (1996).
The author adds that
Nawal Saadawi, a feminist activist, was often berated and mocked for her direct attacks on
males. An Islamic male writer was incredulous that she remarked that behind every female
in jail was a male figure. Saadawi's statement was taken to mean a rejection of the principle
of male guardianship over women, which alone diminished her credibility.
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feminist because she posits the sexual oppression of women at the heart of
Arab patriarchy (symbolized by the cultural obsession with women's virginity):
"Arab society still considers that the fine membrane which covers the aperture
of the external genital organs is the most cherished and most important part of a
girl's body, and is much more valuable than one of her eyes, or an arm, or a
lower limb. 47 Saadawi has been more daring than anybody else in promoting
an agenda of sexual liberation in the Arab world.48 She shares with other
forces of the left the idea that the oppression of women functions similarly to,
and can only be addressed in conjunction with, other forms of oppression.49
However, when it comes to actual positions on family law reform, Saadawi
adopts feminist views that are typical of the center (liberal feminism). 50
Id. at 138.
47. NAWAL EL SAADAWI, THE HIDDEN FACE OF EvE 26 (Sherif Hetata ed. and trans., 1980). El
Saadawi, a medical doctor, is also one of few Egyptian feminists vehemently and honestly to attack
female genital mutilation (FGM), or female circumcision. Part I of her book, THE HIDDEN FACE OF
EVE, is boldly titled "The Mutilated Half," and graphically discusses the horrors of her personal
experience: as a six year old, she was forcibly subjected to FGM in her home. Id. at 7-8.
48. See TALHAMI, supra note 46. In addition, there are other characteristics to her advocacy that
set Saadawi apart from other feminists and place her on the left of the spectrum:
Nawal al-Sa'dawi is unusual among advocates of women's liberation in arguing that men and
women are.., fundamentally alike, and that the socialization process of children in Egypt
distorts the personalities of both men and women and ultimately oppresses them both. Her
controversial approach to sexual issues has not drawn a wide following in Egypt, although it
has attracted a good deal of attention. It is interesting to note that even al-Sa'dawi, whose
theses are built on a socialist rather than a specifically Islamic societal model, does appeal
nonetheless to religious values and to examples from the early Islamic community that
provide a precedent for more active and diverse social roles for women.
Valerie J. Hoffman-Ladd, Polemics on the Modesty and Segregation of Women in Contemporary Egypt,
19 INT. J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 23, 43 (1987).
49. See EL SAADAWI, supra note 47, at 41. Like other leftist writers and theorists, Saadawi links
sexual oppression and gender inequality, especially in the context of a developing African nation like
Egypt, to notions of power and economic oppression by colonial and post colonial Western powers and
their local agents. Thus she states that, "I firmly believe that the reasons for the lower status of women
in our societies, and the lack of opportunities for progress afforded to them, are not due to Islam, but
rather to certain economic and political forces, namely those of foreign imperialism operating mainly
from the outside, and of the reactionary classes operating from the inside." Id.
50. For instance, the following passage reflects El Saadawi's position regarding the issue:
Many verses of the Qur'an refer to the fact that all people are equal before Allah, and that he
created males and females so that there could be mercy and love between them. 'He it is who
created out of you couples, so that you may live together, and have mercy and love for one
another' (Qur'an, sura al-Rum, verse 21). This verse is interpreted as bestowing upon a
woman the right to choose her husband, and to be separated from him if she no longer wishes
to live with him, since love, mercy and cohabitation presuppose free choice rather than
compulsion. On the basis of this verse Muhammad gave women the right to choose their
husbands, as well as the right to be separated from them. However women were stripped of
these rights at a later stage through the statutes and laws promulgated on the basis of so-
called Islamic jurisprudence.
THE NAWAL EL SAADAWi READER 82 (1997). Thus, El Saadawi focuses on the liberal feminist
concepts of equality, autonomy and consent, as well as refusing to reject altogether religious arguments.
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2. The Identity of the Egyptian Legal System
Positions on the question of the identity of the legal system in Egypt as a
whole (i.e. "should it be Islamic or not?") 51 also vary between rightists,
centrists and leftists. 52  For the rightists, all laws should be Islamic.53  They
argue that Islamic law is different from Western law and that the historical
adoption of a Western legal system by the Egyptian political elites has alienated
the Muslims of Egypt from their authentic traditions based on Islamic law.54
Therefore, they argue that the secular aspects of the legal system today should
be reconstructed and reconceived to become Islamic:
Even the non-religious [Muslims] can appreciate the need for laws that
reflect the convictions of the people and engage their support. Islamic
51. The different positions discussed here refer to arguments for and against a legal system that
would be more "Islamic," meaning that in general the source of the laws would be Islamic law, or the
shari 'ah. This contrasts with and indeed challenges the current bifurcation in the legal system between
Islamic rules on the family and secular rules of European origin or influence on almost everything else.
52. My discussion of the various positions or stances concerning the identity of the Egyptian legal
system, as well as those outlined above on gender and family law reform, is meant to be understood
primarily in the context of modem, post-independence Egypt. Although many of these positions or
stances were formulated in the years prior to independence they are meant to be understood in the
modem context of the struggle of an independent Egypt to deal with the lasting effects of European
colonization and the transformation of the Egyptian legal system by the transplantation of European
laws. The tension and debate related to the role of Islamic law in the legal system of Egypt as well as
most Muslim-majority countries were not present until these changes occurred and have had particular
influence and meaning in the post-colonial context, where societies are struggling to define newly their
national identity.
53. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK,
AND RETURN 19-20 (1998). As Professor Vogel puts it, "[t]oday, after further gains in independence,
many Muslims call for restoring Islamic law as the law of the land." Id. at 20. A discussion of Hasan
al-Banna, (1906-49), the founder of the (Egyptian) Muslim Brotherhood, is instructive:
[c]onvinced that only through a return to Islam (by following the Qur'an and Sunnah of the
Prophet) could the Muslim world be awakened from its lethargy and decline, he organized
religious discussion groups and committed himself to Islamic renewal. A man of great
religious zeal and charisma, al-Banna quickly attracted followers and, in 1928, established
the Muslim Brotherhood, or Muslim Brethren (al-lkhwan al-Muslimun) ... Hasan al-Banna
... concluded that westernization was a major threat to Egypt and Islam, the source of much
of Egypt's political, social, and economic problems.
ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 137. Thus, for al-Banna, "Western secularism and materialism stood out as
major causes of Muslim impotence and decline. The cure for this 'disease' was a return to Islam ....
[A]I-Banna called for a return to the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet as the primary sources for the
reestablishment of an Islamic system of government." Id. In other words, the goal of the Brotherhood
was "the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt," a state where the only source of law is the
shari'ah, or Islamic law. Id. at 138.
54. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 53. As Professor Vogel reports, with respect to the restoration of
Islamic law, or shari'ah, in all areas of the law, "[w]hile for the religious this call is an expression of
piety, it also reflects, among both religious and non-religious persons, a desire for authenticity and
independence, and a rejection of Western 'isms' in favor of the ideal through which Islamic civilization
achieved past greatness." Id. at 20. In addition, as Professor Esposito notes, for the followers of al-
Banna and especially the more radical Sayyid Qutb, "Muslim governments succumbed politically,
militarily, intellectually, spiritually, and culturally to the West. Muslim leaders had failed their
community. . . . Western secularism and materialism undermined religion and morality and thus,
weakened the fabric of society in general and the Muslim family in particular." ESPOSITO, supra note 3,
at 140-141.
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jurisprudence (fiqh) is one of the greatest achievements of Islamic
civilization, and many believe that Muslims may retain it and still find
their own way in the modem world. They can adopt from the West
what is useful, but not at the cost of their cultural identity.
5
The rightist view, which has been adopted by the ulama and the
conservative religious intelligentsia,56 holds that there is a radical cultural
difference between the Muslim "East" and the non-Muslim "West., 57  The
West is Christian (while we are Muslim), it is materialist (while we are
spiritual), and its family has disintegrated and its sexual prohibitions have
collapsed (while our family is tight and our women have honor).,8 The cultural
right proposes four main methods of reconstruction, demonstrating the internal
diversity within their position. These methods (discussed further below)
include injecting Taqlid law with rules derived from Usul al-fiqh when
necessary; a legal realist critique of Usul while reconstructing the law through
reliance on Maslahah or public good; a legal realist analysis of Taqlid law
followed by combining its rules with fresh readings of the original sources of
the religion, balancing the authoritative with the authoritarian; and lastly, a
feminist method based on reinterpreting the original sources afresh in a non-
patriarchal fashion..
Some rightists on the identity of the Egyptian legal system hold that
Islamic law should ideally be based on the historic system of Taqlid law,
injected now and then with the use of Usul al-Fiqh to devise new rules
whenever the need arises. 59  Usul al-fiqh, or the "sources of jurisprudence,"
refers to the legal theory first innovated by the famous Muslim jurist
Muhammad Ibn Idrts al-Shdfi'i in the ninth century.6 The era of Usul, which
spanned the early centuries of Islam, was one in which the schools of law
innovated rules inspired directly by the sources of the religion, i.e. the Qur'an
and Hadith.61 This was done through ijtihad, the religious and legal project of
55. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 53, at 20.
56. For an account of who in contemporary Egypt occupies this position, see Tamir Moustafa,
Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt, 32 INT'L
J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 3, 10-11 (2000).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
59. For a general description of these traditionalists, see Afaf Loutfi Al-Sayed, The Role of the
'Ulama' in Egypt during the Early Nineteenth Century, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
EGYPT 1850-1950, at 264-80.
60. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 41, 45-48 (1982). Shifi'T's theory
was a powerful intervention in the legal culture of the time, so much so that the era spanning the seventh
to the tenth century came to be named after his theory. See id. at 45-48. The author describes Sh~fi'T's
theory in the following statement: "Shafi'i's legal theory is a perfectly coherent system, superior by far
to the theory of the ancient schools, and he became the founder of the usul al-fikh, the discipline dealing
with the theoretical bases of Islamic law." Id. at 48.
61. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 2. ShdfiT, in his book AL- RISALA, argued that all rules of law
applied by qadis (judges) should be based directly on holy sources. See WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY
OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 29-31 (1997). ShAfi'T defined these sources as the Qur'an and Hadith.
2004]
158 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 16:145
coming up with new rules of law directly inspired by the sources of the
religion, or exerting one's effort to discover God's law on a particular matter.
62
In contrast to Usul al-fiqh and ijtihad, Taqlid law refers to the legal
doctrine that was produced by Muslims in the pre-modem era and during the
reign of the various Islamic caliphates.63 Taqlid, meaning "conformism" in
Arabic, is a reference to the historic legal era, spanning from the tenth century
to the nineteenth century, during which Muslim jurists and judges were
understood to have abandoned ijtihad.64
Rather than pursuing the project of legal innovation, the jurists and judges
of the Taqlid era concentrated their legal activity on consolidating the legal
doctrine of the school of law with which they were affiliated. 65  Taqlid,
therefore, is the era during which the doctrines of the various schools displaced
and overshadowed the Qur'an and prophetic traditions as the sources of law.66
See id. at 29. "In establishing the general principles of legal reasoning, Shafi'! insisted that no legal
ruling can be propounded if it is not ultimately anchored in the Book of God and/or the Sunna of His
Prophet." Id. Sunnah is a reference to the collection of Hadith, or the reported traditions of the Prophet
Mohammad, i.e., everything he had been reported to have said, done or approved. See ESPOSITO, supra
note 27, at 5.
62. "As conceived by classical Muslim jurists, Ytihad is the exertion of mental energy in the search
for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist become incapable of further effort." Wael
B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Iltihad Closed? 16 INT. J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 3, 3 (1984). "In other words,
ijtihad is the maximum effort expanded by the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of usul
al-fiqh (legal theory) for the purpose of discovering God's law." Id.
63. See N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 80-81 (1964); SHERMAN A. JACKSON,
ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE 79-80 (1996).
64. See COULSON, supra note 63, at 80-81.
65. Joseph Schacht describes this historical process:
By the beginning of the fourth century of Islam (about A.D. 900) the point had been reached,
however, when the scholars of all surviving schools felt that all essential questions had been
thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a consensus gradually established itself to the
effect that from that time onwards no one could be deemed to have the necessary
qualifications for independent reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be
confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it
had been laid down once and for all. It followed that from then on every Muslim had to
belong to one of the recognized schools.
Joseph Schacht, The Schools of Law and Later Developments of Jurisprudence, in ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 73 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).
66. N. J. Coulson describes the era:
From the tenth century onwards the effect of the doctrine of taqlid was mirrored in the
literature of the law. This consisted mainly of a succession of increasingly exhaustive
commentaries upon the works of the first systematic exponents of the doctrine such as Malik,
ash-Shaybani and ash-Shafi'i. Further glossaries were appended to these commentaries;
different views and lines of development were collated and amalgamated, and concise
abbreviated compendia were produced. Authors, almost without exception, betrayed a
slavish adherence, not only to the substance but also to the form and arrangement of the
doctrine as recorded in the earliest writings. By the fourteenth century various legal texts had
appeared which came to acquire a particular reputation in the different schools and areas of
Islam. Representing for each school the statement of the law ratified by the Yma' [consensus
of the community, or of the ulama (religious scholars)], they retained their paramount
authority as expressions of Shari'a law until the advent of legal modernism in the present
century.
COULSON, supra note 63, at 84.
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One followed, or "conformed to," the doctrine of one's school rather than
attempting a fresh reading of the word of God to construct a new rule.
67
Thus, one proposed reconstructive methodology of Islamic law advocates
respect for the doctrine of Taqlid as an expression of Islamic civilization, while
allowing for micro changes in Taqlid law through the return by Muslim jurists
to the original sources of the religion whenever the need for change in the law
68is pressing. This methodology or position mimics and is nostalgic for the
legal era that preceded westernization of the legal system in Egypt, and has
been historically adopted by the ulama of Egypt's oldest center of religious
learning, al-Azhar.
69
67. See JACKSON, supra note 63, at 95. As one author put it, "[i]jtihad, the exercise of independent
reasoning, gave way to taqlid, the unreasoning acceptance of the final state of the doctrine as laid down
by each school in its recognised handbooks." ANN K.S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN
MEDIEVAL ISLAM 12 (1981).
68. See EsPOSITO, supra note 3, at 316-317; El Sayed, supra note 59.
69. As Professor Esposito notes, "[t]he conservative position is represented by the majority f the
ulama for whom the Islamic blueprint for society continues to be that classical synthesis developed
during the early Islamic centuries and preserved in manuals and commentaries on Islamic law."
ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 316. This position must be understood in light of both the role of the ulama
(and their legal interpretations/formulations) in traditional Egyptian society as well as the historic
position of al-Azhar as the center for Islamic learning, not only for Egypt but the entire Islamic world.
As Afaf Loutfi El Sayed notes:
Traditional Muslim society admitted of two major groups who were set in authority over
the people, these were firstly the military, 'the men of the sword', and secondly the religious,
'the men of the pen'. . . .
This division of society meant that within the Muslim community there were two
potential sources of authority-one stemming from the use of coercive force and vested in
the military, and the other stemming from the use of moral and religious sanctions and vested
in the 'ulama' ....
This was the case for as long as the Muslim community remained aloof from Western
influences. For then the position of the 'ulama' as the intellectual glite was guaranteed, and
their prestige and influence remained great. It was only when the traditional society broke up
to admit westernizing influences that we notice the decline in the authority of the 'ulama",
and their displacement in all their functions, save the religious one, by a social group that
formed a new 61ite of civil servants, lawyers, and journalists ....
El Sayed, supra note 59, at 264-65. Traditionally one of the most powerful ulama of Egypt was the
rector of al-Azhar. See id. at 267. However, since the modernization put in place under Muhammad Ali
in the nineteenth century, the influence of the ulama steadily decreased. See id. at 275-280.
Once education, law, and justice were removed from the hands of the "ulama', their political
influence waned. Once nationalism replaced the overall concept of the Muslim community
as the focus of loyalties, the political influence of religion waned. When the modem Muslim
relegated religion to the realm of the spiritual, and admitted that society could be ruled by a
civil code of law, his dependence on the 'ulama'as other than religious teachers disappeared,
and their influence on him in matters other than religion disappeared likewise.
Id. at 280. One author, for instance, describing the controversy and debates concerning the reform of the
civil code in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s, finds it remarkable that "[t]he civil law, unlike the law of
personal status, was not even remotely connected with religion .... " FARHAT J. ZIADEH, LAWYERS,
THE RULE OF LAW AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT 135-136 (1968). However, there were many
elements who "wanted a code based partly on Islamic law." Id. at 136. He explains this as having to do
with the presence of al-Azhar in Egypt:
The very existence in Cairo of al-Azhar University, the guardian of Muslim learning, seemed
to impose on Egypt the moral duty of championing Islamic matters. Some considered it
futile for al-Azhar and the Egyptian University [today's Cairo University] to continue to
teach the shari'ah while it was being largely ignored in formulating the country's codes.
Moreover, the detailed formulation of shari "ah rules by medieval jurists was, in nationalist
views, a manifestation of the 'Arab genius' which should be used in the rejuvenation of the
entire Arab world and the unification of its laws.
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A second method proposed by the cultural right advocates reconstructing
Islamic law, first through the use of a legal realist critique of Usul that would
deconstruct qiyas (analogy), the principal source of law (after the text of the
Qur'an and Hadith), 70 as incoherent, and then through the use of the category of
maslaha (public good or welfare) as the alternative privileged source of the
law.7 t Rashid Rida, the disciple of Mohammad Abduh,72 is known to have
advocated this position, looking to maslaha as a source of law.73 Because the
Qur'an and the Sunnah (the words and deeds of the Prophet Mohammad, as
recorded in the Hadith, or reports), the two primary sources of Islamic law,74
have fallen short of providing all the answers to problems related to civil
transactions (as opposed to questions related to worship and belief),75 it is
necessary to consider worldly interests, or masalih dunyawiyya, to deal with
76
such problems.
Id. at 135-136. During the discussion of Sanhuri's draft code in the late 1940s, "Azharite ulama had
insisted that the shari'ah alone should form the basis for any recodification." Id. at 145. Thus, in light
of the fact that in the face of modernization and the transplantation of European laws in Egypt, the
ulama of al-Azhar have witnessed their jurisdiction (and that of Islamic law) shrinking steadily, it is
easy to understand why they would be nostalgic for the preceding era, in which they (and Islamic law,.
which they often interpret) reigned supreme. For a detailed discussion of Sanhuri's drafting of the civil
code, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
70. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 6-7. Esposito gives a detailed description of this source of law,
reporting that
[q]iyas is a restricted form of ilihad (personal reasoning or interpretation); it is reasoning by
analogy. The noted jurist Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (d. 1285) defined qiyas as "establishing the
relevance of a ruling in one case to another case because of a similarity in the attribute
(reason or cause) upon which the ruling was based."
Id. at6.
71. See HALLAQ, supra note 62, at 217.
72. See id. at 214. "It was in the writings of Muhammad 'Abduh that the seedling of religious
utilitarianism was planted, and it was left for his disciple, Rashid Rida (d. 1935), to give fori. and
content to a potentially powerful idea .... [T]he cornerstone of the utilitarianist thesis was the concept
of maslaha . I..." Id.
73. See id. "What Rida excluded from the domain of traditional qiyas he replaced by the concept of
maslaha. Id. at 217. Hallaq gives an elaborate overview of Rida's theory. See also ESPOSITO, supra
note 27, at 145 (reporting that, "[t]he employment of the principle of maslahah as a source of
contemporary legal reform was championed by Muhammad Abduh and his follower, Muhammad
Rashid Rida .. ")
74. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 3-6. Professor Esposito provides a detailed discussion of the
two principal sources of Islamic law. He reports that, "the primary material source of the revealed law is
quite naturally the Holy Quran, the source book of Islamic values." Id. at 3.
Just as Muslims turned to the Prophet for decisions during his lifetime, so after his death they
looked to his example for guidance. In classical theory, the Sunnah of the Prophet consists
quite simply in the normative model behavior of the Prophet ....
The record of the Prophetic words and deeds is to be found in the narrative reports or
traditions (hadith) transmitted and finally collected and recorded in compendia.
Id. at 5.
75. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad reports that modernists "opened the way to reinterpretation (itihad)
by distinguishing between ibadat (doctrines, beliefs and rituals), which they defined as eternal and not
open to reinterpretation, and muamalat (human relations), the political, economic, cultural, social, and
educational issues that should be reinterpreted for each age." Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Islam and
Gender: Dilemmas in the Changing Arab World, in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 3, 3-4
(Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & John L. Esposito eds., 1998).
76. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 145. As Esposito reports:
The traditional juristic position was that the muamalat (social transactions) regulations
of the Quran and Sunnah had rational connotations and that God's purpose in revealing them
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In addition, falling under the cultural right approach to the "reconstruction"
of Islamic law, Mohammad Abduh, known as the "Father of Muslim
Modernism, 77  advocated the methodology of supra-madhhab.78  This
particular method consists of adopting rules from the doctrinal pools of the
various Islamic schools of law, or madhhab, through a pick-and-choose
legislative activity. 79 It is a supra-madhhab method of legislation in the sense
that the legislature is understood to be without loyalty to a specific
schoollmadhhab, as was the case in the pre-modem era of Islamic history. The
legislature approaches the task with a sense of floating loyalty to all schools,
picking the most eligible rule wherever it may be found, thereby expressing a
modem legislative sensibility.0
A third method proposed by the cultural right argues that Islamic law
should be reconstructed through a realist analysis of the medieval Taqlid law
(as opposed to Usul, as proposed in the methodology explicated above), which
is then treated as the "raw material" to be reconceived against the grain of the
main religious sources of the Qur'an and the prophetic tradition.8' According
to this methodology, the modem scholar approaches medieval Taqlid law
trying to find various rational explanations for its rules, only to discover that
whereas there are a "number of intelligible principles that do appear to animate
the law," none of these principles, in fact, "explain all results. 82 She is then
forced to concede that, "as in many areas of law in any legal system, outcomes
do not follow from any single policy, but from many which, through
competition and cooperation, seem to give law its final shape., 83  This
was the promotion of human welfare. Thus, a jurist should select an interpretation that best
accorded with the public interest (maslahah).
Abduh and Rida extended this concept so that in the event that a particular social need
was not covered by specific Shariah texts, a jurist using his reason might interpret the law in
light of the public interest.
Id.
77. See id. at 149.
78. See Aharon Layish, The Contribution of the Modernists to the Secularization of Islamic Law, in
14 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 263, 263 (1978).
79. See id. As Layish describes it, "[t]he modernists tried to synthesize the materia of the Sunni
schools of law by the doctrine of selection (takhayyur) or combination (talfq, lit. patch-work)." Id. As
Hallaq reports, "[aicknowledging that the doctrine of a single school no longer served the purposes of
the reformers, recourse was made to a device according to which law could be formulated by an
amalgamated selection (takhayyur) from several traditional doctrines held by a variety of schools...
[m]oreover, the reformers resorted to the so-called talflq according to which part of the doctrine of one
school is combined with a part from another." HALLAQ, supra note 62, at 210.
80. See HALLAQ, supra note 62, at 210.
81. See, e.g., VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 53, at 23-24. The authors, in discussing the move
among many Muslims today to conduct what is popularly known as Islamic banking and financing,
make clear that when referring to the source of rules on Islamic banking, they are alluding to classical
fiqh, "by which we mean the law as constituted in the immense corpus of legal writings by religious
scholars from the eighth to the eighteenth century (before the westernizing transformations)." Id. at 24.
Fiqh, or Taqlid law, is used as the basis for study, in light of "the perfect, immutable Divine Law itself
as revealed in the Qur'an and the Sunna," to come up with rules on Islamic banking and finance. Id. at
23.
82. Id. at 78.
83. Id.
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realization should then liberate the modem scholar and allow her to come up
with new doctrines that combine the medieval with a new reading of the
original sources.84
A fourth method proposed by the cultural right argues that Islamic law
should be reconstructed through a re-interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith
with the goal of "striking a balance between authoritativeness and
authoritarianism. '' 85  Khaled Abou El Fadl, one advocate of this position,
argues that
because religion, as doctrine and belief, must rely on human agency
for its mundane existence, one runs the risk that those human agents
will either render it entirely subjectively determined, or render it rigid
and inflexible. In either case, one risks that the Divine will be made
subservient to human comprehension and human will.
86
Thus, "the inevitable negotiation that must occur between the author, text, and
the reader" should be explored.
87
A fifth method proposed by the right, promoted by the Lebanese-American
Azizah al-Hibri, recommends reconstruction but is based on a feminist agenda.
The proponents of this method argue that Islamic law should first be rebuilt
through a critique of the medieval Taqlid law as patriarchal (pre-modem
Muslim jurists who interpreted the sources of the religion were all really sexist)
and then reconceived afresh on the basis of new interpretations of the Qur'an
and prophetic traditions on gender. 8 This position specifically argues that a
serious reading of these sources reveals that God and his prophet really support
84. See id.
85. KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD KNOWS THE SOLDIERS 34 (2001).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See al-Hibri, supra note 29, at 5-6, 25.
Many aspects of the life of Muslims in Muslim countries, including their views on the
education of women and their family laws, rest in substantial part on medieval Islamicjurisprudence. Scholars based this jurisprudence on two components: religious and cultural.
The cultural component gave rise to certain fundamental social and political assumptions.
These assumptions have become so deeply-rooted in Islamic jurisprudence that many
Muslims are no longer aware of their non-religious origins. The assumptions gave rise to a
then common model of state and family relationships which are best described today as
authoritarian/patriarchal.
Id. at 5. According to al-Hibri, the key to overcoming norms based on patriarchal readings and
interpretations of the sources of religion is to reexamine and reinterpret them: "The best method for
resolving disagreements among Muslims is the one suggested by the Qur'an itself. The Qur'an clearly
states that if believers disagree among themselves on a matter, they should seek the answer in the Qur'an
and the sunnah of the prophet." Id. at 25. I include Azizah al-Hibri in my typology although she is not
Egyptian because she sees herself as involved in the project of reform of Muslim family law in the Arab
world, including Egypt. AI-Hibri discusses the personal status codes of a handful of Muslim-majority,
Arabic-speaking countries, including Egypt, analyzing provisions of particular relevance to women
(those dealing with obedience, divorce initiated by the wife, etc.), and concludes that the patriarchal
tendencies of medieval jurists led to the development of the jurisprudence and rules that said provisions
are based on. See id. at 10-25.
[Vol. 16:145
2004] Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate
a vision of gender equality. 89 Thus, al-Hibri advocates the idea that traditional
jurists who believed in the patriarchal model actively worked to make that
model a universal reality by passing conservative laws that were highly
restrictive and harmful to women. 90  Relying on prevailing stereotypes about
gender roles, they used their legal power to assert the automatic qiwamah
(guardianship over women) of all men.9 1
According to al-Hibri, such actions by the jurists defeated both the
intention of Qur'anic verses that sought to limit the scope of qiwamah, as well
as the Equality Principle laid out in various verses of the Qur'an.92 Al-Hibri
argues that "thoughtful Muslims should no longer accept that interpretation;
and Muslim women must rediscover the truth of the Qur'anic Equality
Principle in order to achieve liberation and freedom without guilt. '93  To
achieve this goal, Muslim women must formulate a strategy for change that
includes a dramatic increase in the number of women seeking legal and
religious education.94
89. See id. at 26-27.
Muslims who are vain and arrogant, whether for individual, racial, economic or gender-
related reasons, engage in Satanic logic. The Qur'an states clearly and repeatedly that we
were all created from the same nafs (soul) ....
.. On the question of gender, the Qur'an informs us in surat al-Rum that God created
for us from our anfus (plural of nafs [sic] mates so that we may find tranquility with them,
and God put affection and mercy between us. 'That,' the Qur'an adds, 'is a sign for those
who ponder.' (I will refer to this ayah as the Equality Principle.) This ayah on gender
relations is repeated in various forms in the Qur'an. Consequently, we may justifiably
conclude that it articulates a basic general principle about proper gender relations; namely,
that they are relations between mates created from the same nafs, which are intended to
provide these mates with tranquility, and are to be characterized by affection and mercy.
Such relations leave no room for Satanic hierarchies which result only in strife, subordination
and oppression.
Id. AI-Hibri goes on to discuss and give her interpretation on several other passages from the Qur'an as
well. See id. at 27-34.
90. See Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Deconstructing Patriarchal Jurisprudence in Islamic Law: A Faithful
Approach, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER 221, 229 (Adrien
Katherine Wing ed., 2000). AI-Hibri explains that
the traditional approach of Muslim jurists toward women was often based, even in the case of
Qur'anic interpretation, on patriarchal assumptions. These assumptions resulted in stripping
Muslim women of their God-given rights. Furthermore, not only did traditional jurists
espouse a patriarchal model of gender relations, they even worked actively at making it a
social reality. They passed restrictive laws that were highly detrimental to women.
Id. AI-Hibri advocates, therefore, that "it is important to unmask the patriarchal assumptions lurking
within present laws in Muslim countries, and to reveal them for what they are, neither divine nor
condoned by the Divine." Id. at 221. See also al-Hibri, supra note 29, at 5, 34-35 ("Traditional jurists
not only espoused the patriarchal model, but they actively worked at making it a universal reality by
passing restrictive laws which were highly detrimental to women.").
91. See al-Hibri, supra note 29, at 34-35.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 35.
94. See id. at 5-6,35.
One problem immediately presents itself .... To critically examine patriarchal Islamic
jurisprudence from within the tradition, a woman must be familiar with the logic of usul al-
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence and its basic principles of reasoning). This requirement is
difficult to satisfy because over the centuries patriarchy has drastically reduced women's
access to the arena of Islamic jurisprudence despite the women's early involvement and
contribution to it. Consequently, the demand for the education of women, particularly in the
area of religious studies, is critical.
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There are several echoes of al-Hibri's project in Egypt, but she seems to be
one of the most articulate advocates of this brand of Islamic reconstruction. 95 It
is noteworthy that her project places her easily in the camp of "liberal
feminism," as the thrust of her reconstructive argument involves
reinterpretation to do away with Islamic textual references to formal inequality
between the genders, and maintains that formal equality with its implicit
advocacy of choice, consent and autonomy for women, is the defining message
96
of the Qur'an on gender issues.
The centrist position on the question of the identity of the legal system
implicit advocates for legal hybridity. This position argues that the
contemporary identity of Egypt is a hybrid, embracing not only Islam but other
sources of identity as well, such as Arab-ness (conceived in modem times as a
form of nationalist identity that covers the Arabic speaking world) and
Egyptian-ness (conceived in modem times as a form of local nationalist
97identity peculiar to Egyptians). Those who hold this position seem to be more
concerned about modernity rather than authenticity, and if the concern for the
former has driven modem Egyptian elites to transplant Western law in Egypt in
order to modernize the legal system, so be it. 98 According to the proponents of
Id. at 5-6.
95. See KARAM, supra note 10, at 11-13. The author discusses what she terms as "Muslim
Feminism" in Egypt, a movement that encompasses activists who use Islamic legal sources (primarily
the Qur'an and the Sunnah) "to show that the discourse of equality between men and women is valid,
within Islam." Id. at 11. These women believe that "women are indeed capable of taking on tasks
involving the interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence." Id. at 12. Such Egyptian feminists are "arguing
against existing patriarchal religious formations/hierarchies, and the implications of their interpretations
on gender," and are "extensively studying, analysing and referring to traditional Islamic texts, in order to
validate and justify their arguments." Id. They are, ultimately, working to "contextualize religious (and
particulary Qur'anic) injunctions, in order to allow for the possibilities of textual reinterpretatior ....
Reinterpretation involves challenging the traditional, hierarchical, institutional and predominantly male
religious power structures, a task which women in general are not encouraged to do . I..." Id. See also
supra notes 166-167 (discussing Egyptian lawyer Mona Zulficar, a senior partner in a large Cairo law
firm and advocate of the promotion of women's rights through the reinterpretation and reintroduction of
historical Islamic sources and methods, such as the use of conditions in marriage contracts favorable to
women).
96. See al-Hibri, supra note 29, at 27.
97. See Enid Hill, Islamic Law as a Source for the Development ofa Comparative Jurisprudence,
The 'Modern Science of Codi(ication' (1): Theory and Practice in the Life & Work of "Abd Al-Razzaq
AhmadAl-Sanhuri, in ISLAMIC LAW: SOCIAL & HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 146, 147 (Aziz A1-Azmeh ed.,
1988). Hill reports that Sanhuri, the drafter of the Egyptian Civil Code
attempted nothing less than to develop a comparative legal 'science' within which islamic
[sic] law was incorporated. As far as the Arab countries were concerned, he viewed such a
theoretical enterprise as having direct and important practical applications. But whereas
islamic [sic] law was a singularly important and significant component of the law in Arab
countries, it was still not the only component of the living legal experience of a given people.
He sought also to discover and apply the 'spirit' of the law-past and present-in a
Montesquieuian sense, to be known from a particular country's historical development-
socially, economically, and legally.
Id. (emphasis in original).
98. See id. at 167, 169. Hill reports that Sanhuri constructed the Egyptian civil code "using
comparisons of more than twenty modem codes, the jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts, and the
islamic Shari'a," id. at 169, and asserted that Islamic law "'must be studied in the light of the most
recently developed principles of comparative law,"' id. at 167 (quoting Le droit musulman comme
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this position, modem strategies for legal reform by local elites should be treated
as sources of modem identity on par with medieval Islamic law.99 The
reconstructive methodology this position supports includes the possibility of
combining rules derived from Western law with those derived from the historic
legal system of Muslim Taqlid law, an approach that they do not regard as
jeopardizing the identity of an authentic cultural self.100
The historic compromise struck between the secular nationalist male elites
of Egypt and the religious ulama based on Islamicizing family law and
Europeanizing the rest of the legal system is an instance of this centrist
position. 1°1 Describing the historic process during which this compromise was
619ment de refonte due code civil igyptien, in 3 RECUEIL D'tTUDES EN L'HONNEUR D'EDOUARD
LAMBERT 623 (1938)). In his early writings on his envisioned civil code, he declared that it would be
based on three sources: "'Our special experience, the experiences of other states, and our past traditions
of law'." Id. at 164 (citing 'Ala ayy asas y&Jan Tanqlh al-Qdnfin al-Madani al-Misrl, 2 Al-kitib al-
Dhah&bT. lil-Madkim al-AhlTya 119 (1938)).
99. On this point, the following passage is instructive:
Sanhuri himself, writing some twenty years later, says that 'the new Code continues to be
representative of Western civil culture, not islamic [sic] legal culture'. His view was that
Egypt's Western-based civil law had become part of the country's legal culture, and 'a
sudden return [to islamic [sic] law] would have been difficult and would have caused
disturbances and confusion'.
If the new Code had not become comprehensively islamic [sic], it had, however,
become 'Egytianised' in that, as Sanhuri emphasized, the legal rules taken from foreign
Western codes 'have an existence independent of the sources from which they are taken'.
This included, of course, also those rules of foreign origin taken from the old Code, which
had, moreover, already been filtered through the Egyptian environment in the application of
these rules by Egyptian judges.
Id. at 172.
100. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. The advocates of this position appear to be
deeply ambivalent about the relationship between the Muslim "East" and the non-Muslim "West." The
West is good and bad, a source of both identification and injury. The West is good because it is the site
of liberal humanism and legal liberalism, more specifically democracy and human rights. However, it is
bad because it is biased against Islam, misrepresenting it with hostility and arrogance. Moreover, the
West does not appear to appreciate the greatness of the Muslim Orient and its civilization.
101. See NORMAN ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 34-39 (1976). As the author
reports,
[i]t was only in the sphere of family law, in the widest connotation of that term, that the
reformers did not venture to intrude until a considerably later date. As a result, a clear-cut
dichotomy emerged not only in the law but also, in most of the countries concerned, in the
courts which applied it. On the one side there was statute law, in the form of codes of largely
secular origin, applied by a new set of 'national' courts in which lawyers, trained in modern
law schools, followed contemporary principles of evidence and procedure; on the other side
the family law of Islam, uncodified and unchanged, administered by courts of the classical
pattern in which lawyers, trained in the traditional way, applied the time-honoured system of
evidence and procedure.
Id. at 34-35. Even though rules on the family were codified in most Muslim-majority countries by the
mid twentieth century, they were codifications of shari'ah or Islamic law rules, not transplantations of
Western laws. Anderson compares the family law to the transplantations of Western law in other fields:
no such reforms were regarded as appropriate, at this time at least, to the family law of Islam.
For, however true it may be that the whole of the Sharf'a is regarded as based on divine
revelation, this is particularly true, as we have seen, of all that pertains to family relations. It
was in this sphere that the provisions of the Qur'dn itself were most explicit and abundant;
that the practice of the courts had always been most meticulous; and that the connection
between law and doctrine, between daily life and the very structure of Islam itself, was most
clearly perceived. As a consequence, Muslim governments have never been willing--except
only in Turkey since Ataturk and in Albania under Communist rule-to put the SharT'a on
one side in this sphere in favour of a law of alien origin and inspiration. On the contrary,
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struck, Daniel Crecelius notes that the modem leaders of Egypt found it
impossible to impose reform upon the ulama, and therefore created "entirely
new institutions to duplicate the functions of the religious ones still under the
control of the conservatives." 10 2 For instance, Egypt passed secular laws to co-
exist with the shari'ah, and increased the number of secular courts. 103 It was
through this slow process of indirect change and subversion that the Egyptian
legal system changed. 1°4 Over the course of the nineteenth century, these new
secular institutions
gradually expanded their functions at the expense of traditional
institutions until the scope of the shari'ah was reduced to personal
status law (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.) and the kuttab-madrasa
[religious school] system had fallen to a secondary status behind the
secular system of primary, secondary, and university schools
developed by the state and the non-Muslim minorities.' 05
Another instance of the centrist position is the reconstructive methodology
of Abd El-Razzak Sanhuri, the drafter of the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949, the
first Civil Code adopted in post-colonial Egypt.10 6 Sanhuri's methodology
relies on comparative law and various mediation strategies and injects the
Western-transplanted law with Taqlid law.1°7  For instance, under the
leadership of Sanhuri, the drafting committee of the 1949 Code considered not
only the experience of the Egyptian judiciary since the changes of the
nineteenth century, but also the modem codes in place in other civil law
countries of Europe, as well as shari 'ah.'0 8
A third example of a centrist position is the test developed by the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC) in its exercise of judicial review.' °9 The
Muslims in general feel strongly that their family law must somehow remain essentially
Islamic.
Id. at 38-39.
102. Daniel Crecelius, The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL
MODERNIZATION 67,79 (Donald Eugene Smith ed., 1974).
103. Id.
104. As a result of these processes, "[t]wo societies touching at every point but having virtually
nothing in common now coexisted alongside one another. The result was cultural chaos." Id. at 79. In
response, people adopted differing positions on the debate concerning the identity of the legal system, a
debate that would last well after the reforms and secularization were originally put in place. Reformists
(as opposed to reformers, who actually were in the position to put reforms in place and were generally
secular elite, while the former were religious intellectuals) such as Muhammad Abduh "tried to relocate
the boundaries between religion and science, between reason and faith," and essentially, between
Eastern and Western, religious and secular, Islamic and European. Id. at 80.
105. Id. at 79.
106. See Hill, supra note 97, at 146, 163-177.
107. See id. at 164, 173-174. The author provides a list ofshari'ah law concepts that Sanhuri
incorporated into the Code, noting that the debt to the shari'ah "is not inconsiderable." Id. at 173. This
list is borrowed from earlier works of J. N. D. Anderson. See ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 92-94.
108. See supra notes 97-99.
109. See supra note 35.
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test, which can also be seen as exemplifying the hybridity position, was
developed by the SCC in order to determine the Islamicity of various pieces of
contemporary legislation upon the request of religious litigants who demanded
that the court strike down certain laws as un-Islamic and therefore in violation
of Article 2 of the Constitution. °10 Under the Court's test, legislation that
violates determinate rules of the Qur'an or the Hadith is treated as
unconstitutional because it is un-Islamic; however, when there is no evidence
that such determinate rules are violated by modem legislation, such legislation
is deemed constitutional even if its origins are secular or European.11' In other
words, the Court's test seeks to preserve the contemporary hybrid quality of the
Egyptian legal system.
The leftist position on the question of the identity of the Egyptian legal
system is not entirely clear. In general, it seems to be based on the political
idea that the problem with the West is not really its difference, but rather its
power. 12 Thus, the West is colonialist, imperialist, orientalist, disciplinary and
110. In 1980, following a national referendum, several provisions of the Egyptian Constitition
were amended, including Article 2. See Gisbert H. Flanz & Fouad Shafik, Egypt, in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 5 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1984). Article 2 was
modified to read as follows: "Islamic jurisprudence will be the principle source of legislation." Id. at 15.
Also, see Lombardi, supra note 37, at 83. Before the amendment, Article 2 established that the shari'a
"is a principal source of Egyptian legislation." Id. at 85 (emphasis added). The language of Article 2, in
its present, amended form, is not odd or unique to the Egyptian legal system; indeed, as one author
reports, "[t]he provision contained in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution is not peculiar to Egyptian
constitutional law. Similar provisions are found in numerous Arab constitutions." BEIz, supra note 37,
at 231.
111. The Court's test proceeds as follows: First the Court searches for determinate rules in the
Qur'an and sometimes in the prophetic traditions that the legislation may be understood to violate. The
Court often finds that no such rules exist. However, even if it is found that there are rules that the
legislation contradicts, the Court proceeds to assert that these rules are jurist-made and themselves the
subject of controversy among the various medieval schools of jurisprudence. In such cases, the Court
takes one of two alternative approaches. The Court either asserts the right of the legislative branch to
legislate outside the domain of the determinate rules in pursuance of a rule that takes public welfare into
account; or the Court reads into the various determinate, but ambiguous rules a general principle that the
legislation does not necessarily violate and declares it constitutional as a result. The looseness of this
test seems to express the Court's commitment to the preservation of the secular legislative domain as it
exists today and its desire to deliver it from the encroaching reach of the interpretive arm of God's law.
This description is based on my reading of various opinions of the Court as well as commentary on their
decisions. For another author's description of the SCC's test, which is parallel to mine, see Lombardi,
supra note 37, at 99-102.
112. It is this very power that has allowed the West, in particular Orientalists, to dominate the
debate and discussion regarding the Islamic "Orient;" thus, the old colonizers continually analyze the
old colonies, and deem them to be inferior and oppressive to women. See generally SAID, supra note 9.
The late Said wrote eloquently and authoritatively on the subject.
Orientalism can also express the strength of the West and the Orient's weakness-as seen by
the West. Such strength and such weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any
view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of
tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference.
For that is the main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism. Can one divide human
reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures,
histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By
surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the
hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into "us" (Westerners) and "they" (Orientals).
Id. at 45.
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patriarchal. 13 What is puzzling, however, is that while the left tends to treat
the historic event of the introduction of the Western legal system in Egypt as an
instance of power, either in the mode of the exercise of Western power over the
Muslim East, the adoption by local Eastern elites of Western styles of power
and discipline through law and regulation, or in the form of collaboration
between Western power and local patriarchy, it nevertheless does not seem to
have a position on the identity of the legal system that is analytically related to
its "power" theory. In other words, while the left seems to associate the advent
of European law with power, it does not have a reconstructive proposal as to
how to be rid of this "bad" product of power.
114
An emerging strand in Middle East historiography formulated in American
academia can be understood to represent an instance of the leftist position on
the issue of the identity of the Egyptian legal system. In describing the
development of criminal codes in Egypt in the early part of the nineteenth
century, Khaled Fahmy uses the Foucauldian concepts of discipline and power
to describe this new form of legality." 5 He argues that the goal of the move
from the "rituals" of public punishment to the "routines" of a criminal legal
113. See LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM 150-152 (1992). Ahmed's argument
focuses on the intersection of colonialism, orientalism and paternalism in the development of the
attitudes of the West towards the East, which served to justify colonialism and have survived well into
the post-colonial era.
In the colonial era the colonial powers, especially Britain... developed their theories of
races and cultures and of a social evolutionary sequence according to which middle-class
Victorian England, and its beliefs and practices, stood at the culminating point of the
evolutionary process and represented the model of ultimate civilization .... [W]hat was
created was the fusion between the issues of women, their oppression, and the cultures of
Other men. The idea that Other men, men in colonized societies or societies beyond the
borders of the civilized West, oppressed women was to be used, in the rhetoric of
colonialism, to render morally justifiable its project of undermining or eradicating the
cultures of colonized peoples.
Id. at 150-151. Thus, "the Victorian colonial paternalistic establishment appropriated the language of
feminism in the service of its assault on the religions and cultures of Other men, and in particular on
Islam . I. " d. at 152.
114. Said drew links between Western power and the present state of the East:
The Arab world today is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite of the United
States .... [T]he Arab and Islamic world remains a second-order power in terms of the
production of culture, knowledge, and scholarship. Here one must be completely realistic
about using the terminology of power politics to describe the situation that obtains. No Arab
or Islamic scholar can afford to ignore what goes on in scholarly journals, institutes, and
universities in the United States and Europe; the converse is not true.
SAID, supra note 9, at 322-23. The arguments I discuss below, formulated by U.S. based academics
linking the modem state of the Egyptian legal system (and that of most Muslim-majority countries) with
this exercise of power, do not propose how the legal system can be rid of this negative product of power;
indeed, I propose that their position, nostalgic of the legal system that preceded the current one as it was
purely Eastern, native and indigenous, allows them to accept the Islamist arguments of the religious
right, which call for a renewed Islamization of the legal system. Thus, we have the occurrence of an
otherwise secular left tending towards and perhaps accepting and incorporating the position of the
religious right.
115. See KHALED FAHMY, ALL THE PASHA'S MEN 117-19, 126, 133-137 (1997). The author,
relying heavily on the work of Timothy Mitchell (author of COLONISING EGYPT) reports that many of
the "reforms" carried out in Egypt in the late nineteenth century "were informed by ideas of power,
order and progress that worked on physical bodies and material space in a minute, exact and meticulous
manner, exhibiting what Foucault called disciplinary, microphysical power." Id. at 117-118.
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code was to represent the Pasha, or ruler, in his absence, using the law as a
powerful symbol of his wishes and desires. 1 6 According to Fahmy,
[b]y defining offenses, fixing scales of punishments, identifying who
in the bureaucratic-legal hierarchy is to execute the punishment, the
legal code also functions as one of the ever-potent tools of power. By
creating a mental association of crime and punishment, the legal code
instills in the minds of people the feeling of the inevitability of
punishment and its link to the crime being performed. Laws, civilian
or military, owing to their abstract codification of crimes and their
corresponding punishments, and to their association of the possible
benefits of crime with the greater disadvantages of punishment,
function as an effective deterrent to crime, and thus as a powerful
means to impose discipline.'
17
The new historiography on women in the Islamic world views the codified
reforms in family law carried out by the secular nationalist elites of the post-
Ottoman era as a form of state patriarchy enacted as part of the elites' alliance
with European imperial powers." 8  In addition, these historians assert that
women in the Ottoman era actually enjoyed quite a bit of freedom, choice and
autonomy, and it is only a matter of researchers exerting the effort necessary to
find evidence of this phenomena. 119 This historiography can be seen as an
instance of the leftist position of "the West is power."
116. Seeid. at133-134.
117. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
118. Amira El Azhary Sonbol asserts:
It seems clear that as states in the modem Islamic world began to mobilize work forces and
make and arbitrate laws, their legal jurisdiction was extended to social intercourse. In this
way, the state became a direct determinant of patriarchal relations, which were molded along
the lines of the ruling elites' hegemonic discourses. This new situation, which we can label
'state patriarchy,' differed from earlier forms of patriarchy where the family head was the
arbiter of power relations within the family and in which 'urf (tradition) determined the
extent and nature of the patriarch's powers. In the modem discourse, the state became an
actual "creator" of culture as well as the promulgator of laws that were enforced directly
from a central government. Because the new states and monarchies were the direct or
indirect creations and allies of imperial European powers, they could not depend on
"traditional legitimacy" alone for a hegemonic discourse. In regard to women,
modernization meant their education and mobilization into the work force where they were
needed. However, modernization was not meant to jeopardize traditions regarding gender
roles.
Amira El Azhary Sonbol, Introduction, in WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC
HISTORY 1, 8-9 (Amira El Azhary Sonbol ed., 1996).
119. See Nelly Hanna, Marriage Among Merchant Families in Seventeenth-Century Cairo, in
WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 143 (Amira El Azhary Sonbol ed.,
1996). The author looks at the stipulations included in Islamic marriage contracts by women of
merchant families in seventeenth century Cairo and finds that although
[t]he family remained essentially patriarchal in structure.., conditions in the seventeenth
century had brought about modifications in the contours of that structure. The family
structure was influence by the state's being weak and distant and by the growing role that the
courts of Cairo were playing in people's everyday lives. In an age before the modem
codification of law, the qadi [judge] had a wider scope for movement. The courts seem to
have been finding ways to accommodate both the changing norms among the various
segments of the population and a wide spectrum of diversity.
2004]
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Amira El Azhary Sonbol takes this type of position. She argues that as
modem nation-states in the Islamic world began to make and arbitrate laws,
their legal jurisdiction was extended to include social issues, making the State a
major determinant of patriarchal relations.1 20  El Azhary Sonbol refers to this
phenomenon as state patriarchy, which differed from earlier forms of
patriarchy; instead of placing the head of the family as the arbiter of power, as
dictated by u-f, or tradition, it posited the state as the "creator" of culture and
the drafter of laws that were enforced by a central government.121 Although the
new States and rulers, who were direct or indirect creations and allies of
imperial European powers, led attempts at modernization that included the
education of women as well as their integration into the work force, the end
result of these modernizing efforts and state patriarchy involved a change that
included the introduction, through codification, of personal status laws that
were "even stricter than the religious code that had been applied in shari'a
courts before the modem period." As a result, courts and other institutions lost
the prior flexibility that allowed them to serve justice according to customary
rules and norms.
123
Because of the left's tendency to represent the modern/European as bad,
colonial and disciplinary, it seems open to and willing to accommodate cultural
reconstructive projects of Islamic law proposed by the right. This is evidenced
by critical analyses that devote much attention to showing that the current legal
Id. at 154. Thus, courts upheld stipulations restricting husbands' movements, limiting and at times even
prohibiting him from sleeping outside the house; limiting or forbidding him from practicing polygamy
or obtaining a concubine; and obligating him to live with his wife's family. See id. at 153. The author
notes that the end result of the growth of the modem state and the institutionalization of state patriarchy
in nineteenth and twentieth century Egypt "was that women were often living under more restrictive
conditions than they had before. In other words, in the process of state building itself, as the state took
over some of the functions families had been doing, the family, and most particularly, women, were
deprived of some of their mobility." Id. at 143.
120. See El Azhary Sonbol, supra note 118, at 8-9. For passages quoted from El Azhary Sonhol's
discussion, see supra note 118.
121. Seeid. at9.
122. El Azhary Sonbol, discussing the contradictions that modernization policies have brought to
Egypt and other Muslim-majority countries, notes that
[n]othing exemplifies more the contradictions of modem state patriarchy than the fact that
today Muslim women can aspire to becoming the heads of governments, yet they face often
insurmountable difficulties in divorcing their husbands. When asked questions directly
related to nation-state building, such as "Who has the right to citizenship?," most Muslim
countries deny citizenship to the children of mothers whose husbands are foreigners but
bestow citizenship on the children of fathers whether the mother is foreign or not .... In
short, questions related to nation-state structures have been used by male-dominated elites to
introduce gender inequalities, notwithstanding their endorsement of modernity.
Id.
123. Id. at 12. The author reports that when "[t]he modem nation-state encouraged legal reforms,"
it
increased state control over the family through an amplification of male control over women
(wives and daughters) and minor children (girls and boys), and this by establishing state-
approved codes of law, standardized education ofjudges, and restructuring of court systems.
These reforms actually limited the social maneuverability that was possible earlier when
qadis [judges] could pick and choose from all Islamic codes and 'urf[customary] precedents.
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regimes in place in majority Muslim countries like Egypt are actually more
harmful to women than historic, pre-colonial religious institutions. For
instance, when criticizing what they call state patriarchy, authors do not argue
that the problem is that personal status laws are based on the shari'ah, or
religious law, but that "the shari 'a that came into being after the modernization
of law and the reform of courts differed from the previous one in that it was
designed to favor the new hegemonic order coming to power as part of the
nation-state structure."
124
C. Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate
When debating family law reform throughout the twentieth century,
mainstream Egyptian feminist activists had to contend with the fact that,
quickly and almost invariably, the discussion turned into an argument with their
adversaries about Islamic law.125 Thus, more often than not, their interlocutor
adversary, resistant to the feminist reform, hurled back in their direction a
Qur'anic verse or a prophetic tradition to demonstrate that the feminist
reformist goals were un-Islamic.126 Naturally, some of the feminists involved
124. Id. at 11. El Azhary Sonbol adds that
[i]t is a mistake to believe that the shari'a code applied by nation-states in the modem period
is simply a vestige of the past and hence to regard traditional laws as the cause for the present
subjugation of women, when in fact the causes of subjugation are located in the modem
reforms and the handling of personal laws. Therefore, one should avoid seeing modem
Muslim states as being consciously involved in socialization to free their populations from
the 'shackles' of traditional customs because what they are involved in is the institution of
new customs labeled as 'shari'a' that deny previous freedoms while emphasizing earlier
discriminations.
Id.
125. I argue that this is intimately related to the fact that changes brought about in Muslim-majority
countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries resulted in legal systems consisting of European legal
transplants in most areas of the law, and religious, or Islamic, law in the realm of personal status and the
family. As El Azhary Sonbol notes, "the modem division of legal codes and the court system into the
secular and religious... is generally attributed to nineteenth-century legal reforms, Western penetration,
and capitalist growth." El Azhary Sonbol, supra note 118, at 9. It is for this reason that "the continued
association between Islamic law and Arab nationalism" is "a form of nationalist 'cultural loyalty' in
resisting the cultural colonialism of the West," and is most pertinent in the area of family law, the area
where religious law still reigns supreme. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted). Nadia Hijab, noting the fact
that "Arab women are not yet fully involved in the modem sector," asserts that, "the question of the role
of women in society is inextricably linked to the issue of the role of religion in society.., both [issues]
are tied up with the quest for national political and economic independence and development." HIJAB,
supra note 30, at 7-8.
126. One example of a verse from the Qur'an that figures prominently in debates surrounding
family law is related to the issue of "wife's obedience," Sura Al Nisa (The Chapter on Women), Verse
34 (also referred to as verse 4:34, since Sura Al Nisa is the fourth chapter, or sura, in the Qur'an): "Men
have authority over women because Allah has made the one superior to the other, and because they
spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient. They guard their unseen parts because
Allah has guarded them. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them and send them
to beds apart and beat them. Then if they obey you, take no further action against them. Allah is high,
supreme." THE KORAN 370 (N. J. Dawood trans., 1974). One Muslim woman who has "reread the
sacred text from a woman's perspective" asserts that "the passage intends to provide a means for
resolving disharmony between husband and wife." AMINA WADUD, QUR'AN AND WOMAN: REREADING
THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN'S PERSPECTIVE 74 (1999). According to Wadud, even if the third
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in the debate found themselves drawn into the hermeneutic path as a response,
re-interpreting the verse and tradition to show that the reformist project was
religiously based. 127  In addition, they often found it useful to point out that
most rules on the family were developed by jurists living in and influenced by a
patriarchal medieval culture. 128  Other feminists, those of a more secular
leaning, resorted to social science arguments, hoping that their religious
adversaries would be impressed by numbers and statistics about broken
marriages and children impoverished by divorce. 29  The interlocuior's
argument, challenging the Islamicity of the feminists' reforms, was a normative
success, effectively locking feminists into a discussion about "Islam," while
locking them out of a discussion about the patriarchy.
130
"solution" (beating) is reached, the nature of the husband's beating "cannot be such as to create conjugal
violence or a struggle between the couple because that is 'un-Islamic."' Id. at 75.
127. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 100-101, for a discussion of one important instance of such
reinterpretation, advocated by Muhammad 'Abduh and employed by Tunisian lawmakers, whereby the
Qur'anic verse permitting polygamy (up to four wives) has also made this practice conditional upon
doing justice to these wives, such justice, according to the reinterpretation of the relevant verse, being
impossible to achieve. Sura Al Nisa, Verse 3 states:
If you fear that you cannot treat orphans with fairness, then you may marry other women
who seem good to you: two, three, or four of them. But if you fear that you cannot maintain
equality among them, marry one only or any slave-girls you may own. This will make it
easier for you to avoid injustice.
THE KORAN, supra note 126, at 60. This verse is reinterpreted to prohibit polygamy in light of verse
4:129, also from Sura Al Nisa: "Try as you may, you cannot treat all your wives impartially. Do not set
yourself altogether against any of them, leaving her, as it were, in suspense. If you do what is right and
guard yourselves against evil, you will find Allah forgiving and merciful." Id. at 74. For an account of
this reinterpretation of relevant Qur'anic verses in regards to polygamy by Egyptian feminists as early as
the first half of the twentieth century, when the EFU was active in advocating family law reforms, see
BADRAN, supra note 5, at 129 ("Feminists countered the Qur'anic permission for a man to take four
wives, conditional upon equal treatment, with a Qur'anic verse saying, 'You are never able in spite of
your efforts to be equitable towards your wives,' insisting that it was impossible for a man, as a good
Muslim, to practice polygamy.").
128. For an example of both the reinterpretive move and the cultural move, see al-Hibri, supra note
29. Although al-Hibri is a Muslim American, her argumentative tropes are familiar and have
historically been used by Egyptian feminists, as fully illustrated by Mona Zulficar's work, discussed at
infra notes 166-167.
129. See TALHAMI, supra note 46, at 112-113. The author reports that, during the organizing that
took place to reform various aspects of family law in Egypt in the 1970's, led by the President's wife,
Jihan Sadat,
[p]art of the women's mobilization campaign involved the release of reports and public
studies supporting their position, including a study by a Cairo University law professor
linking juvenile delinquency to the high incidence of divorce. Also receiving wide
circulation and publicity was a study by Dr. 'Azizah Hussein, one of the founders of Egypt's
Family Planning Association and the first female member of Egypt's UN delegation, that
established a correlation between Egypt's rising birthrate and women's fear of divorce.
Id. See also Badran, supra note 5, at 130-131. Badran, looking at feminists' efforts as early as the
1920s and 1930s, reports that, "[fieminists observed the lives of countless women and families disrupted
by divorce .... Divorce was a potential threat to all women, although its effects varied according to
class and circumstances." Id. at 130-131.
130. The result was that patriarchy was accepted as the framework within which to work, as
demonstrated by the comments of one author regarding early feminists' efforts in Egypt to bring about
family law reforms: "What feminists saw as 'patriarchal excesses' men regarded as 'patriarchal
privileges."' BADRAN, supra note 5, at 126. This "acceptance" of patriarchy fits into the Orientalist
model which assumes the patriarchal nature of the Islamic East, a model that not only grew with vigor as
part of colonial discourses but persists until the present day.
2004] Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate
The normative power of the adversary should not be underestimated. Not
only did it often silence feminists pushing for reform in family law; more
importantly, it historically succeeded in inhibiting the development of an
elaborate cultural critique of the institution of patriarchy in the family, forcing
mainstream Egyptian feminists to be content with micro legal reforms that
passed the "Islamic" muster. 131 As a result, much of the Egyptian feminists'
critique of family law in the twentieth century could, in retrospect, be
characterized as moderate: most feminists did not challenge the notion of the
family predicated on the distribution of (what some scholars call)
complementary rights and responsibilities to women and men (i.e.,
transactional reciprocity). 132 In essence, they seem to have accepted the notion
of different gender roles in the family while insisting on equality in difference,
thereby adhering to the mainstream cultural view that women's and men's
family roles and relations were ordained by religion.
33
Due to the struggle with their religious adversaries, much of the attention
of Egyptian feminists was focused upon the abuse by Muslim men of what is
recognized, according to the traditional interpretations of Islam by the scholars
and jurists of Al-Azhar, 13 4 as their lawful rights and responsibilities.'3 1 In this
[E]ven though Islam's peculiar practices with respect to women and its "oppression" of
women formed some element of the European narrative of Islam from early on, the issue of
women only emerged as the centerpiece of the Western narrative of Islam in the nineteenth
century, and in particular the later nineteenth century, as Europeans established themselves as
colonial powers in Muslim countries.
AHMED, supra note 113, at 150. This narrative was created as part of a
broad, all-purpose narrative of colonial domination regarding the inferiority, in relation to the
European culture, of all Other cultures and societies .... [F]inally and somewhat ironically,
combining with these to create the new centrality of the position of women in the colonial
discourse of Islam was the language of feminism ....
Id. Thus, until the present day feminists face attacks as being agents of the West, or of espousing
Western ideals or engaging in a Western discourse, almost as if a defense of patriarchy was better than
an attack of it, even if such attack is internal and not waged by external forces. This position is quite
ironic indeed considering the fact that the patriarchal discourse is itself largely a colonial creation (even
if the institutions upon which it focuses, such as polygamy, are not).
131. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 126-135. "In its campaign to change the Muslim laws of
personal status, ahwal shakhsiyah, the EFU's commitment to Islam was clear, and the organization
never deviated from insistence upon reform within the framework of Islamic religious law, the shari'ah."
Id. at 126.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 126-137. Badran reports that historically, Egyptian feminists' attitude and position
towards their roles within the family were similar to those taken with regards to family law reform:
"Mirroring the feminists' approach to the family's legal structure, discussion on women's activities
within the family highlighted conventional roles and responsibilities, displaying no overt quarrel with
the 'traditional' distribution of authority that privileged men." Id. at 136.
134. For a description of AI-Azhar, see Moustafa, supra note 56. As Moustafa describes it, Al-
Azhar is "traditionally Egypt's most respected and influential center for Islamic study." Id. at 3. Al-
Azhar was established in 973 A.D. See id. at 4.
135. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 125-126. Badran reports that, "[u]sing Islamic modernist
arguments feminists aimed to ameliorate the functioning of the family through curbing men's abuses of
their prerogatives, particularly divorce and polygamy, and men's neglect of their duties, especially
support of wife and children." Id. at 125. She adds that, "[g]iven the appropriation of Islam-an Islam
narrowly or mistakenly read-by the patriarchal family and the legal regulation of the family by the al-
Azhar-based Islamic religious establishment.., the task the feminists undertook was exceedingly
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respect, the difference between the position adopted by these mainstream
Egyptian feminists on the question of gender roles within the family and that of
what I have described as "Islamist feminism" is that for the former, the
advocacy of "equality in difference" seems to be tactical and non-ideological,
whereas for the latter, "equality in difference" represents the normative ideal
that expresses the proper structure of gender relations.1 36 It is for this reason
that mainstream feminists have always engaged in and supported their tactical
agenda of reform advocacy with an elaborate discourse on liberal feminism. 
137
While its normative power is undeniable, there is nevertheless something
odd about the Islamic argument, in that it takes place against the background of
an Egyptian legal system that has undergone, over the past one hundred and
thirty years, a serious and radical rupture from its Islamic past. 138 Throughout
this period, the elites of Egypt have, for various political reasons, progressively
dismantled the Islamic legal system: they abolished its rule structure,
dismantled its courts, and disenfranchised both its qadas, or judges, and its
ulama.139 While identifying itself constitutionally as Islamic, 140 the Egyptian
state no longer organizes itself around the idea that it derives its legitimacy
from overseeing the application of God's law, (the shari'ah), as had been the
case in the Islamic world for centuries before. 141  Indeed, throughout the
difficult." Id. Limiting feminist critique to the idea that men simply "abuse" their religiously ordained
rights and responsibilities is by definition an inadequate attempt at critiquing patriarchy. The fact that
these rights were, historically, widely understood to be religiously ordained made the possibility of an
elaborate critique difficult, if not altogether impossible. This, I believe, continues to be the case.
136. See id. at 125-126. As Badran notes, mainstream Egyptian feminists "did not challenge the
notion of the family predicated on the distribution of complementary rights and responsibilities to
women and men. Feminists accepted different gender roles in the family but insisted on equality in
difference." Id. at 125. In this way they did not challenge the "mainstream view that women's and
men's family roles and relations were ordained by religion." Id. Islamist feminists, however, engage in
an ideological discourse that clearly distinguishes themselves from mainstream, liberal feminists
precisely because although they may say that they adhere to the idea of "equality in difference," they
also maintain that the reason women are oppressed is because they are trying to be "equal" to men by
taking on roles outside of the family traditionally associated with men. See KARAM, supra note 10, at
10. Thus, they are prone to engage in a '"call to arms,' which enhances and reconceptualizes women's
role within the family (as mothers and wives), and gives women a sense of value, political purpose and
confidence..." Id. In contrast, mainstream feminists as early as the 1930s emphasized "women's dual
roles." BADRAN, supra note 5, at 137.
137. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 126-137.
138. See supra notes 5-6,9 and accompanying text.
139. See ANDERSON, supra note 101. For another account of the current state of the Egyptian legal
system which also highlights the ways in which it was transformed from its prior Islamic structure, see
HERBERT J. LIEBESNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 258-267 (1975).
140. See Lombardi, supra note 37, at 85 (reporting that Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, in
place since 1971, "declared Islam the official religion of the country.")
141. See H. A. R. Gibb, Constitutional Organization, in I LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (Majid
Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).
At the root of all Islamic political concepts lies the doctrine of the umma, the Community of
Muslims. In its internal aspect, the umma consists of the totality (jama'a) of individuals
bound to one another by-ties, not of kinship or race, but of religion, in that all its members
profess their belief in the One God, Allah, and in the mission of His Prophet
Muhammad .... The Head of the umma is Allah, and Allah alone. His rule is immediate,
and His commands, as revealed to Muhammad, embody the Law and Constitution of the
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contemporary Egyptian legal system, laws have European origins, courts are
secular, and judges are trained in secular law schools and appointed by the
centralized powers of the state to interpret and implement laws in ways familiar
to European civilian lawyers.142  Long gone are the days when the Islamic
rulers were dependent on the ulama for legitimacy. 143
Moreover, the claim that feminists' demands were un-Islamic were
typically, neatly and conveniently packaged by the same religious adversaries
with another equally powerful claim: that feminists were agents of the West.
144
As Margot Badran reports, "[a] common counterattack on women's assumption
of agency as feminists-on behalf of gender and nation-has been to discredit
feminists, and feminism, by branding them Western agents of colonialism.
14 5
Given the frequency and consistency of this of critique, one assumes that
its proponents often viewed the two charges as implicit in each other.
146
Mainstream feminists may be charged with advocacy of Western culture; of a
uniquely Western sexual promiscuity; of a Western style of feminist male
umma .... The Law precedes the State, both logically and in terms of time; and the State
exists for the sole purpose of maintaining and enforcing the Law.
Id. (emphasis added).
For centuries the law has held a paramount place in the civilization and structure of the
Muslim world, at least in the Islamic ideal. The prestige it has enjoyed may indeed be
regarded as without parallel in history, for this civilization was uniquely based on religion,
and the religion of Islam has always accorded a preeminent place to law.
LIEBESNY, supra note 139, at 3.
142. See ZIADEH, supra note 69. See also LIEBESNY, supra note 139, at 258-267; ANDERSON,
supra note 101, at 35. Badran reports that, "[t]he adoption in the nineteenth century of secular
commercial and civil law, based on French models, necessitated a cadre of new, secular lawyers. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries law became the most prestigious profession for men."
BADRAN, supra note 5, at 181.
143. For an account of the process of the disenfranchisement of the ulama in Egypt that began in
the nineteenth century, see Crecelius, supra note 102, at 73-75.
144. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 24 ("The charge of derivative feminism, a reductive and
agency-depriving mode of thinking, still lingers .... East equals authentic and good; West equals alien
and bad.").
145. Id. However, the author asserts that, "Egyptian feminism was not a subtext of colonialism or
'Western discourse,' but an independent discourse that simultaneously engaged indigenous patriarchy
and patriarchal colonial domination." Id.
146. For instance, for a discussion of the debates surrounding Law 44 of 1979 (Jihan's Law) and
the twin charges of the un-Islamicity of the law as well as the Western tendencies of those supporting it,
see TALHAMI, supra note 46, at 122. The author explains that the greatest resistance to official efforts
on behalf of women during Sadat's presidency
was offered by defenders of the Shari'a. Traditionalists and Islamist forces feared the
regime's assault on the integrity of the Shari'a, seeing this as part of a larger Westernizing
wave. But the extent of their furor also resulted from their ingrained view of the ideal
Islamic woman. In this regard, the intensity of the battle of the personal status law was
simply a reflection of the clash of cultures, one modem and secular, the other traditionalist
and communal, each with its own version of the public and private roles of women.
Id. This twin charge of un-Islamicity with Western identification often put these feminists in the reactive
position of assertion and disassociation. Thus, they asserted both that they were Muslim while at the
same time denying any identification with the West or with male-hating feminism. They were simply
"modernizing" Muslims proposing a real and authentic reading of the original Islamic religious texts and
critics of the legal rules and inherited medieval patriarchal culture of the Muslim jurists.
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hating; 147 or, just as easily, with an intent to destroy the Muslim family, just as
happened in the West;148 a blindness to the actual difference of the religious
East from the materialist West; or, paradoxically, an attempt to impose the
norms of the Christian West on those of the Muslim East. 149  As one author
notes, "[d]ebates on whether feminism in Egypt... is Western have included in
the circumference of interrogation political issues of authenticity, national-
cultural 'treason,' and social ir/relevancy-such matters that stack the cards for
the legitimizing or discrediting of 'feminism."" 150 Even more complex, since
the birth of the Egyptian feminist movement in the early part of the twentieth
century, many Egyptian feminists have invariably found themselves engaged in
the project of defending Islam against its Western detractors.' 5' As the position
of women in Islam has been the object of criticism by both the West and local
feminists agitating for family law reform, the latter have found themselves
aligned with the West, despite western, anti-Islamic sentiments.' 52  Western
detractors of Islam often appeared to be acting in bad faith, using their critiques
147. See Azza M. Karam, Feminisms and Islamisms in Egypt: Between Globalization and
Postmodernism, in GENDER AND GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING: SIGHTINGS, SITES AND RESISTANCES 194,
199 (Marianne H. Marchand & Anne Sisson Runyan eds., 2000).
The term 'feminism' is, to all intents and purposes, one that has originated in the West.
Thus, in post-colonial Arab Muslim societies the term is tainted, impure, and heavily
impregnated with stereotypes. One of these stereotypes is that feminism basically stands for
enmity between men and women, as well as a call for immorality in the form of sexual
promiscuity for women.
Id.
148. See Hoffman-Ladd, supra note 48, at 32-33.
149. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 31 ("Debates on whether feminism in Egypt and more generally
in much of the third world is Western have included in the circumference of interrogation political issues
of authenticity, national-cultural 'treason,' and social ir/relevancy-such matters that stack the cards for
the legitimizing or discrediting of 'feminism."') The author critiques such charges and debates quite
eloquently:
Examining the unfolding of feminism(s) in the context of Egyptian women's experiences and
reflections renders such interrogation redundant. Looking for an essential 'cultural purity'
underlying such debates over feminism is futile. Cultures are constructed; they are fluid and
thus continually in the process of construction and reconstruction .... Egypt historically has
appropriated and absorbed "alien elements" into a highly vital indigenous culture. Attempts
to discredit or to legitimize feminism on cultural grounds, used by feminists and detractors
alike, are political projects predicated on divergent ways of understanding, or manipulating,
culture and on the willingness or perceived need to perpetuate constructs of "East" and
"West."
Id. at 31-32. See also Hoffman-Ladd, supra note 48, at 28 (referring to "a veritable torrent of literature
about and for women, appealing to them as 'the foundation of the virtuous Muslim society,' urging them
to adopt Islamic values for the salvation of the nation, and warning of imperialist plots to destroy Islamic
society by 'liberating' women in Western fashion"). See also KARAM, supra note 10, at 13 (reporting
that criticisms launched at what she calls "secular feminists," who usually frame their discourse within
the language of international human rights, rather than any religion, include that "they are clones of the
West, implementers of imperialist agendas, and - the ultimate delegitimizer - non-believers").
150. Id.
151. See id. at 25. As the author notes, "Egyptian feminists and other progressives living in the
West sometimes take apologetic positions on conservative or reactionary practices, sacrificing the
urgencies of gender issues that women feel in Egypt to a nationalist defense of 'Islam."' Id.
152. See id.
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to assert cultural superiority and rationalize projects for unwanted intervention
in the Islamic world.1
5 3
Finally, legal concepts like equality, autonomy and consent have
performed a crucial role in mainstream Egyptian feminism's response to the
patriarchy, making it strongly reminiscent of 19th century American
feminism. 154 Egyptian feminists focused their political activism on a number of
legal institutions historically identified as pre-modem bastions of male
power. 5 5  These institutions included: the marriage of minors, 56 no-fault
divorce for men,' 57 polygamy,15 and the doctrine of obedience. 59  Egyptian
153. See ARMED, supra note 113, at 149, 151-52. The Ahmed text refers to European colonialism
as the discourse that combines "concern" for Muslim women and advocacy of intervention via
colonialism. But see Mariz Tadros, Veiled Insinuations, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, July 29-Aug.4,
1999, at http:/Aveekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/440/1i2.htm (illustrating how some Egyptians today think of
the international human rights movement as the new discourse that combines concern for women with
advocacy of intervention). Tadros, referring to the views of an Islamist lawyer, Montasser EI-Zayyat,
reports that, "EI-Zayyat contended that efforts at banning niqab and female circumcision are part and
parcel of the same package: the enforcement of the agenda of the International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD), which seeks to obliterate the Islamist wave in the Middle East -- a
task that has been facilitated by globalisation..." Id.
154. The majority of feminists in the United States during the nineteenth century insisted t-at all
legal and social institutions that reinforced the power of men over women and privileged the former over
the latter should be removed, even if the majority of them believed that women and men had different
roles to play in the family context. Their liberal feminism resided in their insistence upon the removal of
the hurdles to formal inequality. See THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT (James Cooper &
Sheila Mclsaac eds., 1973). For an historical account of liberal feminism in the United States during the
19th century, see Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L. J. 1073 (1994). See also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization
of Marital Status Law Adjudicating Wives'Rights To Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127 (1994).
155. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 124-35.
156. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 50. See also BADRAN, supra note 5, at 127-28. Badran
reports that child marriages arranged by family members and guardians historically prevailed in Egypt;
the case of the famous feminist Huda Sha'rawi is one example. When Huda Sha'rawi was twelve, her
marriage was arranged to her own cousin and guardian, 'Ali Sha'rawi who was "some three decades her
senior." Id. at 35.
The establishment of a minimum marriage age for girls was one of the first two demands the
new EFU [Egyptian Feminist Union] presented to the Egyptian government (the other was
for secondary schools for girls) .... The EFU asked in 1923 that the minimum marriage age
for girls be set at sixteen. A decree law that same year fixed the age at sixteen for females
and eighteen for males.
Id. at 127-28. In addition, see RON SHAHAM, FAMILY AND THE COURTS IN MODERN EGYPT 53-55, 57-
63 (1997), for a useful account of efforts by feminists'("Egyptian women's organizations") to establish a
minimum marriage age, the legislation that resulted, and the interpretation/application by qadis sitting
on shari'ah courts of such reforms.
157. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 130-31. As Badran reports,
[f]eminists approached the question of a wife's security by demanding regulation of divorce
(talaq), which is strictly a male prerogative. If polygamy was less common and confined
largely to certain strata of society, divorce was widespread across classes and regions. Under
the Islamic shari'ah a man could repudiate his wife simply by pronouncing a formula in her
presence or absence, with no witnesses, and at any time or place .... The EFU requested that
men be permitted by law to divorce a wife for serious reasons only, and only in the presence
of a qadi [judge], who would first oblige the two parties to submit to arbitration conducted by
representatives from each side. The demand was not met; the 1929 revised code simply
declared that divorce pronounced by a man who was intoxicated or under duress was invalid.
Id. Thus, a "[mian's ability to divorce was still not controlled; a major source of insecurity to women as
wives and mothers remained." Id. at 131. Professor Esposito notes that Qasim Amin, a contemporary
of Mohammad Abduh and fellow modernist, "was especially critical of arranged marriages, the wife's
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feminists called for improving the financial well-being of divorced women,1 60
and increasing the age until which mothers have custody of their children in
cases of divorce.16 ' Liberal feminism, as it is known in the West, remains the
most powerful ideological engine for informing and shaping the nature of
Egyptian feminist demands for reform of family law. 162
Islam, the West and the patriarchy represent the defining ends of the
triangle within which mainstream liberal Egyptian feminism currently finds
itself trapped. 163 Egyptian feminism has developed a response towards each of
lack of power to divorce, and the husband's unlimited rights of divorce, all of which he believed
perpetuated the bondage of women." ESPOsITO, supra note 27, at 49.
158. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 48-49, 59. Esposito notes that modernist Mohammad Abduh
was "especially critical of polygamy and its deleterious effect on family life." Id. at 48. See also
BADRAN, supra note 5, at 128-30. Badran reports that the influential Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU)
and the WWCC (Wafdist Women's Central Committee) "called for reform of the personal status code,
especially laws regarding polygamy and divorce, to be accomplished within 'the spirit of religion' for
'justice and peace to reign in the family."' Id. at 95. Prominent early feminists working outside the
structure of feminist organizations such as the EFU and WWCC, such as Qasim Amin, author of the
famous Tahrir al-Mar'ah (The Liberation of the Woman), also advocated for the elimination of the
abuses of divorce and polygamy. See id. at 18-19.
159. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 18-19, 131-32. For instance, Badran reports that, "[f]eminists
wanted bayt al-ta'ah purged altogether from the personal status code, strongly denouncing an institution
that enabled a husband to obtain a judge's order to forcibly return a wife who had left home without his
permission. Such a woman is legally defined as nashizah (disobedient/rebellious) .... Id. at 131.
Also, see SHAHAM, supra note 156, at 81-83, 91-97, for a complete discussion of the requirement of
wifely obedience and the way it was interpreted and enforced by qadi courts in the first half of the
twentieth century.
160. See BADRAN, supra note 5, at 131.
161. See id. at 132-33 ("In Egypt, where the Shafi'i school predominated, mothers retained custody
of daughters until the age of nine and sons until the age of seven. The EFU favored extension of
maternal custody, suggesting that girls remain with their mothers until marriage and boys until puberty,
in accordance with the Maliki rule .... The EFU won a partial victory in 1929 when the new law
extended custody for mothers to eleven years for girls and nine years for boys.")
162. See id. at 135. Implicit in the above activist agenda is faith in the triple liberal concepts of
equality, consent and autonomy. Thus, women should be able to divorce too; there should be a minimum
age for marriage to ensure women's consent, as adults, to the marriage; and the doctrine of obedience
should be abolished to ensure women's autonomy. As the author notes, despite all the efforts at the turn
of the century and the first half of the twentieth century by feminists to bring about significant reforms
to family law, many years would pass
before significant changes favoring women would appear in the personal status code. This
change came in the form of a presidential decree issued by Anwar Sadat, with pressure from
his wife Jehan [sic] Sadat [in 1979]. Six years later when it was rescinded, a wide spectrum
of women rose up in a militant campaign demanding the law's reinstatement. An attenuated
version of the law was enacted ....
Id. For another discussion of what is known as Jihan's Law, which was declared unconstitutional on
technical grounds by the Supreme Constitutional Court, and the subsequent Law 100 of 1985, which is
in force today, see ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK 169-
170 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 2002).
163. For an insightful discussion of patriarchy and Islam and the effect their intersection has
historically had and continues to have on Muslim women, see Ghada Karmi, Women, Islam and
Patriarchalism, in FEMINISM AND ISLAM 69, 69 (Mai Yamani ed., 1996) ("Islam and the patriarchal
system, either singly or in combination, have had a profound effect on the status of women wherever
they have been applied."). Discussing in detail patriarchy in present day Arabic speaking countries such
as Egypt, Karmi notes, for instance, that "the differences between male and female school attendance are
striking," and that, "[employment statistics for the Arab world in the late 1980s show a marked
discrepancy between men and women, with the women being consistently and significantly less
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these issues.164 In relation to Islam, it is modernizing, (when its interlocutor is
a religious adversary). In relation to the West, it is an apologist, (when its
interlocutor is Western).165 Finally, in relation patriarchy, it is liberal.1 66  In
economically active." Id. at 71. The intersection, in turn, of the West with Islam and patriarchy, with its
colonial and Orientalist overtones, creates a situation in which the issue of women is difficult to engage:
The sensitivity of this issue is such as to prevent most people from engaging in rational
debate for fear that they will either be branded as Muslim fanatics or as enemies of Islam.
The whole matter is so charged with emotion and paranoia that to attempt a cool evaluation
of exactly what are the rights of women under Islam is no easy matter."
Id. at 72. Clearly one of the most important trends for the future of Egyptian feminism, one that helps to
define various groups of feminists and activists, is the rise of Islamism, a trend judged by many by the
increase (after a decrease in the middle part of the twentieth century) of adoption of the veil, or what is
known as Islamic dress. See AHMED, supra note 113, at 220-34. The intersection of Islamism and
(resistance to) the West, all working within the dominant patriarchal structures in place in present day
Egypt, define many strands within modem day feminism in the country, representing distinct challenges
to liberal feminism:
In the discourses of geopolitics the reemergent veil is an emblem of many things, prominent
among which is its meaning as the rejection of the West. But when one considers why the
veil has this meaning in the late twentieth century, it becomes obvious that, ironically, it was
the discourses of the West, and specifically the discourse of colonial domination, that in the
first place determined the meaning of the veil in geopolitical discourses and thereby set the
terms for its emergence as a symbol of resistance. In other words, the reemergent veil attests,
by virtue of its very power as a symbol of resistance, to the uncontested hegemonic diffusion
of the discourses of the West in our age.
Id. at 235. Unfortunately, this triangle has historically (and continues to) trapped efforts for family law
reform as well. See Haddad, supra note 75, at 5 ("Colonial occupiers are still depicted as obsessed with
weakening Muslim societies by various means. Consequently, the Western call for unveiling and for
restriction on divorce and polygyny is understood as proceeding from this context, that is, the desire to
sap the strength of the Muslim people.").
164. These responses are, of course, distinct to the stance the various positions of the right would
have to each of these issues.
165. See Mona Zulficar, The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt (Jan. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript submitted for 1999 Harvard Law School conference, The Islamic Marriage Contract, on file
with author). Ms. Zulficar's paper proposes the adoption in Egypt of a standard Islamic marriage
contract that contains many optional conditions favorable to women that would combat and over-ride
patriarchal advantages men currently have under Egyptian family law. See id. discussed above, many
authors and advocates argue that patriarchy as it exists today, what they often refer to as state patriarchy,
is actually a product of Western colonial encroachment; thus their liberal stance is not portrayed as
Western but, interestingly, becomes a defense against the West, whose modernizing influences actually
worsened the situation of women by removing the prior flexibility of rules, laws and legal/social
structures. See, e.g., Abdal-Rehim Abdal-Rahman Abdal-Rehim, The Family and Gender Laws in
Egypt During the Ottoman Period, in WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY
96, 102 (Amira El Azhary Sonbol ed., 1996). The author, whose research is based on shari'oh court
records from the Ottoman era in Egypt, reports that
if shari'a court archives demonstrate anything, it would be the great diversity of the
transactions that were enacted, depending on the time, place, and social conditions of the
parties involved. This means that, even though the basic laws followed were shari'a laws,
their administration and execution differed not only from place to place but also from case to
case. Suiting specific conditions was no problem as long as the main outlines of the shari 'a
were followed ....
Id. Ms. Zulficar also refers to the historical use of conditions favorable to women in Islamic marriage
contracts, which are consistent with the shari'oh and were enforced by the shari'oh courts. See Zulficar,
supra, at 9 (reporting that, "[in the historical context, the New Marriage Contract is not novel, as court
archives in Egypt show that Islamic marriage contracts, including conditions to protect the women's
interests and rights and restrict the husband's authority have been a common practice all over Egypt
even before the Ottoman Period [began] in 1517.") In addition, see Haddad, supra note 75, at 3
(reporting that, "[rjegardless of the gender or ideological orientation of the author, one of the main
features of the literature about women is its apologetic nature, betraying a belief that there are Western
values against which it must justify itself.")
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fact, liberal feminism not only informs the Egyptian feminist response to the
patriarchy, but also its responses to Islam and the West. The move to
modernize Islam, combined with apology for Islam, relies strongly on the
notion that one can discover a liberal feminist Islam through a true reading of
the text. 1
67
D. An Unholy Alliance?
Historically, mainstream Egyptian feminism relied on its allies, principally
the national secular male elites and some modernizing ulama,168 to wage its
struggles for family law reform against those, like the conservative ulama, who
oppose such reforms.169 According to my typology of positions in Part A, the
feminists' allies were those (mostly men) who adopted the centrist position on
166. See Zulficar, supra note 165. Ms. Zulficar, a senior partner at the prestigious Shalakany Law
Office in Cairo, asserts that, "[e]qual rights and obligations with respect to religious duties, and
punishment, economic and financial independence and equal rights to contract, own and dispose of
property, challenge the assumption that patriarchal control is inherent in the original sacred book." Id. at
2.
167. See al-Hibri, supra note 90; al-Hibri, supra note 29; WADUD, supra note 126.
168. The most prominent example of such enlightened ulama would be Mohammad Abduh, who
was one of the proponents of the reform of family law in Egypt in the 1920s. See ESPOSITO, supra note
27, at 48-49. As Professor Esposito reports, "Abduh criticized the waywardness of Muslim society:
'The Muslims have erred in the education and training of women, and in not teaching them about their
rights; and we have failed to follow the guidance of our religion, becoming an argument against it."' Id.
at 48. For instance,
the Qur'anic argument that Abduh developed regarding polygamy was to be adopted by all
modernist reformers. According to Abduh, polygamy had been permitted in the Prophet's
time as a concession to the prevailing social conditions. Qur'anic texts (4:3 and 4:129)
establish the norm that more than one wife was only permissible when equal justice and
impartiality were guaranteed. Because this is a practical impossibility, Abduh concluded that
the Qur'anic ideal must be monogamy.
Id. See also JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 67 (2002) ("The controversy
over polygyny started in the early 20th century .... Modem religious reformers, led by Sheikh
Muhammad Abdou (died 1905), advocated restrictions of polygyny, considering it an injustice to the
woman. Other reformers argued that polygyny must be prohibited .... ").
169. For instance, on the issue of polygamy, see NASIR, supra note 168, at 67. Nasir reports that
regarding the interpretation of the Qur'an by Abduh and other reformers as severely restricting or even
abolishing polygamy, "[tihe fundamentalists reacted strongly, arguing that such an interpretation would
render the Quranic allowance for up to four wives absurd and inoperative .... " Id. For a more recent
example of such political "rounds," one can look at the debate on legislating khul' (no-fault divorce for
women) in the Egyptian publication, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg. See,
e.g., Omayma Abdel-Latif, Temporal Tunes, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Mar. 23-29, 2000, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/474/egl0.htm; Amina Elbendary, Conditional Surrenders, AL-AHRAM
WEEKLY ON-LINE, Jan. 13-19, 2000, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/464/spec3.htm; Fayza Hassan,
A Matter of Mistrust, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Jan. 13-19, 2000, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/464/spec2.htm; Fayza Hassan, Women's Destiny, Men's Voices, AL-
AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Feb. 3-9, 2000, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/467/feature.htm; Reem
Leila, Before You Sign on the Dotted Line... , AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, June 22-28, 2000, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/487/li2.htm; Mariz Tadros, The Beginning or the End?, AL-AHRAM
WEEKLY ON-LINE, Mar. 9-15, 2000, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/472/fr2.htm; Mariz Tadros,
One Step Forward, a Hundred To Go, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Jan. 13-19, 2000, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/464/specl .htm; Mariz Tadros, Who Won the Tug-of- War?, AL-AHRAM
WEEKLY ON-LINE, Feb 3-9, 2000, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/467/lil .htm.
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both the question of the identity of the Egyptian legal system and the question
of gender. 170  Their adversaries, on the other hand, were those (also mostly
men) who adopted the combination of a rightist position on the question of
identity and an equally rightist position on the question of gender.'
7 1
Mainstream Egyptian feminism suffered repeated defeats because of its
allies' compromising legal and judicial position. 72 The centrist secular male
elites of Egypt control the legislature. The courts and have consistently
pursued the strategy of splitting the difference between the demands of
mainstream feminism and those of the rightist conservative ulama.17 3  For
example, mainstream Egyptian feminists' demand the abolition of polygamy
while the conservative ulama argue that polygamy is a God-given right. 174 The
170. One example of the centrist stance in Egypt on both the identity of the legal system as well as
gender issues is the famous jurist Sanhuri, whose legal reforn/modemization/codification projects
proclaimed clearly and honestly the intention to incorporate, using comparative methodologies, elements
of both Western laws as well as Islamic law. See supra notes 97-99.
171. As Yvonne Haddad notes, this combination of stances is adopted both by conservatives and
Islamists, each group producing literature that espouses its own views: "[t]he conservative writing is
produced by al-Azhar professors and reactionaries; while the Islamist work is by those who are engaged
in the Islamic revivalist movement." Haddad, supra note 75, at 5.
172. Thus, family law reform has come about in Egypt in a slow, piecemeal fashion, never living
up to the hopes and expectations of feminists. As Professor Esposito notes, "[h]owever much countries
adopted Western political, economic, social, and legal institutions and codes, family law remained
untouched at first, and then it was reformed rather than replaced. Failure to replace family law with
Western codes was a tacit, if not explicit, recognition of the importance and sensitivity of issues of
women and the family in Islamic history and tradition. For, while other areas of Islamic law might
remain an ideal often not implemented, the Islamic law of marriage, divorce, and inheritance had
remained historically intact." John L. Esposito, Women in Islam and Muslim Societies. in ISLAM,
GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE ix, xv (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & John L. Esposito eds., 1998).
173. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 34, for a discussion of various compromises adopted by the
(secular) Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in Egypt on the question of women. The current Law
100 (1985) (amending the laws from 1923 and 1929) on the family is itself a compromise of Jihan's
Law of 1979, passed after the SCC struck down the latter as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Mervat F.
Hatem, Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism, 24 INT'L. J.
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 231, 244-245 (1992). Any gains made by women in the area of family law reform
in Egypt have, historically, been due to support from their allies and official support from the state. The
"state feminism" espoused and supported in the 1950s and 1960s under the socialist welfare regime of
Nasser, which did not change personal status laws, was largely possible because the executive branch
during that era had much more unilateral power than under the present Egyptian political scheme.
During the early 1980s a strong judiciary emerged that "asserted its independence through correcting the
abuses of political power by the executive branch and its intervention in the legislature." Id. at 244. At
the same time, Islamist parties became strong in the legislature, and "[t]his made the legislature very
conservative on social issues and further discouraged the state and its NDP [National Democratic Party]
from supporting women's issues and/or the election of women representatives." Id.
174. Thus, splitting has resulted in restrictions of polygamy but not its outright prohibition. Aware
of limited possibilities to achieve their ultimate goal of restricting polygamy due to the opposition of
conservative ulama and other elements, many mainstream feminists in Egypt have themselves limited
their requests, preferring to achieve restrictions on polygamy rather than face total defeat. See BADRAN,
supra note 5, at 128-130 (describing early feminist attempts to restrict or abolish polygamy based on
Islamic Modernist arguments formulated by Abduh, Amin and others). Professor Esposito reports that
in the early 1970s, when a new constitution was being drafted, there were major attempts at family law
reform in Egypt. Dr. Aisha Ratib, a professor of law at Cairo University, was named Minister of Social
Affairs in 1971, and the Committee for the Revision of Family Law (which she headed) suggested that
the permission of a judge be necessary for a polygamous marriage to take place. ESPOSITO, supra note
27, at 58. This suggestion was incorporated into Law 100 of 1985, the law currently in place. The
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secular courts and legislature have intervened by positing that polygamy,
though a God-given right, is nevertheless of a restricted nature. 175 Thus, they
declared that while polygamy per se is not harmful to women, women may
prove in court that a specific incident of polygamy was harmful to them. 176
The court then determines whether the woman has, in fact, suffered harm due
to the polygamous marriage of her husband.177 As Professor An-Na'im notes,
the questions of harm and of divorce being automatically granted to the wife,
when the husband takes another wife, were the most contentious issues
surrounding Jihan's law. Jihan's law was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Constitutional Court.178 The present law, Law 100 of 1985, represents
a compromise on this issue:
One element that was conspicuous by its absence in the 1985
legislation was the wife's automatic right to a divorce from her
husband if he married polygynously. As a concession to religious
conservatives, the presumption of injury occasioned by a polygynous
marriage was removed, requiring the wife to establish that she has
suffered harm from her husband's polygynous union if she wishes to
divorce. Thus the ground for divorce was no longer automatic [as it
had been under the 1979 law, Jihan's law] but was left up to the
discretion of the courts, as being the wife of a polygynous husband
was no longer automatically equated with 'harm' (constituting a return
to the classical position). 179
feminist Nawal El Saadawi eloquently attacks both divorce and polygamy, consistently arguing for the
complete abolition of polygamy:
The laws on marriage and divorce in Egypt still allow the man to divorce at will and to have
several wives .... Many a time do we leam of children who have been left without food or
shelter after a divorce, or divorced women who have been driven to prostitution as their only
means of livelihood, or young daughters abandoned by their fathers for the arms of a mistress
or the bed of a new wife .... No matter what the situation is, it is always the husband who
makes the decision .... He is supported in whatever position he takes by unjust and cruel
laws.
EL SAADAWI, supra note 47, at 198-199.
175. As Professor An-Na'im notes, under current Egyptian law "[plolygyny is permissible, with
notification of the existing and intended wives. The existing wife may obtain a judicial dissolution [of
the marriage] on grounds of material or moral harm up to one year from the date of her knowledge of
her husband's polygynous union if such harm makes cohabitation as husband and wife impossible."
ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra note 162, at 17 l.
176. This is according to the dictates of Article 11 of Law 100 (1985), which provides that
[a] wife whose husband takes a second wife may petition for divorce from him if she is
affected by some material or moral harm of a kind which would make it impossible for a
couple such as them to continue living together, even if she has not stipulated in the contract
that he should not take further wives. If the judge is unable to effect a reconciliation between
them he shall grant her an irrevocable divorce. The wife's right to petition for divorce on
these grounds shall be forfeit upon the elapse of one year from the date of her knowledge of
the other marriage, unless she has agreed to it explicitly or implicitly.
EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 28, at 58.
177. See id.; see also NASIR, supra note 168, at 68.
178. See supra note 31 for a discussion of Jihan's Law and the SCC's ruling declaring it
unconstitutional.
179. ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra note 162, at 170.
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In other words, the centrist legislature neither abolished polygamy nor treated it
as an absolute right; it simply recognized that it is a right to be exercised by
men, albeit in a restricted m'anner.!
80
Splitting the difference on the substantive level, however, is not the only
strategy that the feminists' compromising centrist secular allies have pursued.
They followed another historic compromise with the religious rightist ulama, in
which the nature of the Egyptian legal system was split, bifurcating its identity.
Most Egyptian laws were understood to be secular: laws of European origin
displaced the historic Islamic legal system.' 81 However, family law was
understood to be religious, derived from Islamic medieval jurisprudence.182
This compromising strategy of double splitting, both in relation to the
substantive doctrine on the family as well as the identity of the legal system as
a whole, trapped mainstream Egyptian feminism in an unyielding triangle of
Islam, West and Patriarchy. The strategy of splitting the difference on the
doctrinal level perpetuated these feminists' longing for liberal feminism:
complete, uncompromised, un-split and unadulterated equality, autonomy and
consent.1
83
In the meantime, splitting the difference regarding the identity of the legal
system exposed mainstream feminists to relentless attacks by the religious
ulama every time they called for reform, as the ulama viewed such reforms as
pushing that which was religious to become secular and European. 84 For the
180. See id.
181. See Haddad, supra note 75, at 5 (reporting that traditionally, while European laws and
institutions penetrated Egypt and other Muslim-majority countries, "[tihe only area that seemed immune
to their interference, but not to derision and sanction, was that dealing with personal status law.")
182. See KARAM, supra note 10, at 144 ("Family Law is ostensibly based on and derived from the
Islamic shari'a, a fact which influences (and in some cases causes) many of the debates raging around
it"); Mervat F. Hatem, Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evolution of
the Postcolonial Nation-State, in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 85, 89 (Yvonne Yazbeck
Haddad & John L. Esposito eds., 1998).
The only aspect of women's lives that was left in the hands of the religious establishment
were the personal status laws that regulated marriage, divorce, and custody of children. It
was the family that represented the sovereignty of the nation and its culture. In this arena,
the very active modem state played a very minimal role. In contrast to a public domain
which, in theory, supported the universal rights of all citizens, personal status laws were left
to bear the marks of cultural difference and gender inequality.
Id. The author describes this as a "laissez-faire attitude to the personal status laws." Id. at 90.
183. This is especially the case considering that Egypt had been a forerunner among Arabic
speaking countries in political and legal developments during the colonial era and the nationalist era of
struggle for independence. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 173
(1996) ("Egypt has often been regarded as in the vanguard of political, social, intellectual, and religious
development in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds.") As Azza Karam notes, for instance, "Egyptian
women were the first Arab women to acquire political rights. Article 32 of the 1956 Constitution
guarantees the political rights of Egyptian women ... the 1971 Constitution affirmed the political rights
of women and their role in society." KARAM, supra note 10, at 152.
184. The stake that the ulama have in the debate is largely based on their "assertion of their
traditional role as guardians of the law. They claim that they alone possess the traditionally accepted
qualifications of a mujtahid." ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 153. Thus, many reformers "view the
traditional ulama as obstacles to change-men whose limited training and world view, as well as a
tendency to protect their own vested interests, prevent them from fully appreciating the demands of
modernity and providing the leadership necessary for Islamic reform." Id. One author's analysis is
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 16:145
conservative ulama, the feminists' calls for reform destabilized the historic
compromise of splitting the difference in regards to the identity of the legal
system. ' 85
E. The New Alliance
Historically, while Egyptian feminism advocated liberal feminism as a
response to the Taqlid-based organization of the family, it had to rely on its
alliance with the secular male elites controlling the state to promote its agenda.
However, the elites' pursuit of the strategy of splitting the difference
continuously frustrated liberal feminism in Egypt.'8 6 Perhaps for this reason,
no internal critique of liberal feminism seems to have developed in Egypt.1
8 7
particularly critical of the ulama: "Many Muslims believe that the disadvantages Muslim women suffer
under have nothing to do with the Qur'an. The problems come from the practical circumstances of time,
place, and location." Carol J. Riphenburg, Changing Gender Relations and the Development Provess in
Oman, in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 144, 163 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & John L.
Esposito eds., 1998). Thus, a "revolution" in the area of gender relations is needed.
[T]his revolution requires a transformation of the group that has done the most to hold
Muslim women back, the ulama, the scholars of Islam. These are the closely knit, all-male,
more or less self-selected coterie of learned men who claim the authority to say what God
means. They made a mistake about women centuries ago and continue to make that same
mistake today.
Id. at 164.
185. Nawal El Saadawi described the current split in the legal system between European inspired
laws in all realms of law except that of personal status and the ulama's stake in said laws in the
following passage:
[I]f we study the history of the Arab countries, it will not be difficult to observe that the
political power of the State was never at a loss when it came to promulgating laws that were
in contradiction with Islamic precepts and legislation. No religious institution was able to
oppose these laws. On the contrary, religious authorities and institutions very often
cooperated with the State and political leadership, and submitted religious teachings to the
exigencies of politics by looking for, and finding new explanations for, old religious texts
which corresponded to the wishes and needs of the rulers ....
.. The same political leaders and the same State apparatus, which acted so decisively
and quickly in so far as religious legislation related to economic needs was concerned,
reversed its attitude in the question of women's status and suddenly became as slow,
lethargic and negative as it had been fast moving, dynamic and full of initiative. Changes in
religious legislation related to marriage and women's life were kept in abeyance. The reason
for these two diametrically opposed attitudes is obvious. Political power and the State
throughout history have refected the interests of the ruling class. The powers that dominated
were not only the representatives of a class structure, but also the representatives of a
patriarchal system where the man is king.
EL S.AADAWI, supra note 47, at 194-195.
186. The fact that Egyptian elites, even if truly committed to the aims of liberal feminism or family
law reform, have had to contend with strong opposition to said reforms from conservatives and
Islamists, helps to explain such splitting. For instance, prominent authors note that groups like the
Muslim Brotherhood criticized Sadat's "enactment of family law reforms. Islamists ridiculed and
dismissed these legal reforms as Western-inspired. They were called Jihan's laws, a reference to Jihan
Sadat, whose mother was British and who was regarded as Westernized." ESPOSITO & VOLL, supra
note 183, at 175.
187. It is helpful, when speaking of Egyptian feminists, or Egyptian feminism, to consider Karam's
position on the existence of feminism as a philosophical strand in Egypt:
'feminism as philosophy', or as a theoretical tool of analysis, as opposed to activism per se,
has yet to develop on the Egyptian-and indeed on the Arab-scene. The preoccupation,
prevalent among women activists, of 'fighting for women's rights', or debating and resolving
'the woman question' (qadiyyat al-mar'a), effectively means that a feminist philosophy
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Concepts such as equality, autonomy and consent still have, seventy years or so
after their initial inception, such normative power for these feminists that they
are marshaled repeatedly, as if they had determinate and clear content.' 
88
The search for an alliance that will free liberal feminism from the
compromises imposed on it by the secular allies has brought certain
mainstream Egyptian feminists to consider a shift in strategy. 89 The coming
together of historians writing a new historiography on Muslim women in area
studies, mainstream Egyptian feminists, and those advocating the project of
cultural identity in the Islamic world as attendees at a conference entitled "The
Islamic Marriage Contract," may very well represent this shift.190
A perusal of the literature presented at this conference indicates that liberal
feminism has now become the call to arms of certain strands of the religious
intelligentsia and other elites who are rightist on the question of identity
(advocating the radical difference of Islam from West and the project of
Islamicizing law), thereby strongly distinguishing themselves from the
conservative religious right with whom they share the rightist agenda on the
question of identity.1'1 Unlike the latter, these religious culturalists see
grounded in a literary discipline, and employed as a means by which textually and actively to
critique and counter dominant practices, is absent. Prevalent are attempts at working at a
variety of levels, on day-to-day issues of concern to women (e.g. literacy classes, legal
awareness classes and income-generating projects). Thus, conceptualizations of women's
activism in Egypt must be seen as enmeshed in struggles for some form of 'women's rights.'
KARAM, supra note 10, at 5. The author defines feminism as, "an individual or collective awareness
that women have been and continue to be oppressed in diverse ways and for diverse reasons, and
attempts towards liberation from this oppression involving a more equitable society with improved
relations between women and men." Id.
188. Thus, feminists continue to push for family law reform in the area of polygamy and divorce,
two issues considered to be related directly to the three concepts of equality, autonomy, and consent.
They also constantly refer to Islamic law norms that guarantee a woman's right to own and dispose of
her property separate and apart from her husband, as well as the fact that Muslim women do not take
their husbands' name after marriage, rules seen as very progressive, the persistence of which are hailed
as important for the concept of both equality and autonomy. See, e.g., EL SAADAWI, supra note 47, at
195. El Saadawi reports that Muslim wives "are better off than their American and European sisters" in
two respects:
[aln Arab woman keeps her name after marriage and disposes of her money in full freedom
and without requiring any form of permission from her husband. These are the only
remaining and very minor vestiges of the matriarchal system that prevailed in Arab society
before Islam, and of the broadmindedness and tolerance of Mahomet the Prophet of Allah,
when compared with other prophets and religious leaders.
Id.
189. As one author, discussing the limitations of secular feminism in Egypt, notes:
One observable facet of feminist progress in recent Egyptian history is that the advancement
of women was never linear in nature. Any study of this issue has to contend with the reality
of the intermittent participation of women in public life and the uneven pattern of their
development. There can be no certainty that the 1860s, Khedive Isma'il's era, were any
worse than the 1890s, or that [early Egyptian feminist and EFU leader] Huda Sha'rawi's
eventful decades were any worse than the 1970s. In fact, serious reversals of women's gains
have already taken place, and general expression of hostility toward the presence of women
in the public arena is more visible today than fifty years ago.
TALHAMI, supra note 48, at 1.
190. The conference was sponsored by the Islamic Legal Studies Program at Harvard Law School
and took place in January of 1999.
191. See 4 ISLAMIC LEGAL STUD. PROGRAM OF HARv. L. SCH. (Islamic Legal Studies Program of
Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass.), June 1999 (on file with author).
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themselves as centrist (liberal) on the question of gender.' 92 For the most part,
they seem to be pursuing projects of reconstruction of Islamic law to arrive at a
liberal feminist account of the law on the family. 1
93
What is attractive about these new modernizing religious culturalists is that
their advocacy of liberal feminism comes as part of a larger package of
Islamacizing the legal system. Many of these factions are involved in the
reconstruction of Islamic law as an alternative to the contemporary secular
legal system that is in place in Egypt today. They, therefore, seem to be
offering mainstream Egyptian feminists an attractive deal: no need for splitting
the difference, the price that the secular centrist male allies extracted from the
feminists. These modernizing reconstructivists of Islamic law carry the stamp
of legitimacy in the eyes of the conservative religious right (the conservative
ulama) because of their anti-secular culturalist project. This position allows
them to avoid the agenda of splitting the difference, in the manner pursued by
the centrist secularists, possibly making them better situated to push the agenda
of liberal feminism. Certain factions of Egyptian feminism may now decide
that it is far more profitable and effective to enter into an alliance with a liberal
feminist, culturalist rightist, religious intelligentsia that is on the rise.
In the old alliance with the secular centrist male elites controlling the
legislature and the judiciary, liberal feminism had to be sacrificed through
splitting so that a secular legislative space could be preserved. The
conservative ulama, having been deprived of their historical domain of Taqlid
law, and forced to be content with family law as the remaining area of
jurisdiction, experienced every reform of family law as an attack on a God-
given right. Incremental reform that preserved transactional reciprocity on the
family but attempted to eliminate its most brutal institutions seemed to be the
only possible path to follow.
In the new alliance, the feminists' allies promote an Islamacizing project
and present themselves as hostile to secular legislation. Splitting as a
compromise or sacrifice of liberal feminism, therefore, does not seem
necessary; as long as it comes garbed with Islamic legal discourse, the new
allies promise it should be fine. The new feminists appear willing to sacrifice
secular legislative space in order to achieve the goals of liberal feminism.
1. Critique of the New Alliance
Implicit in the new alliance is a two-fold danger for mainstream Egyptian
feminists. First, the sacrifice of secular space in exchange for liberal feminism
may be problematic. Women need secularism in the long run. Any reforms
that are pitched as God-ordained, even thought they are liberal feminist
192. See, e.g., Zulficar, supra note 165 (on file with author).
193. See id.
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reforms, may later prove hard to critique. 194  As we have learned from the
modem history of feminism in the Islamic world, anything accepted as divinely
ordained is resistant to change. Were the liberal feminists to achieve their
agenda, thereby facing public criticism for short-comings of their program (as
happened with American liberal feminism), the restrictive nature of their
position could become problematic.
Second, liberal feminist reforms in the context of Islamic family law have
been interpreted by some of their advocates as requiring a major trade-off for
women: Instead of the current transactional reciprocity in the family (husbands
maintain and wives obey) as incorporated in contemporary Islamic family
codes, the liberal feminist argues that women should be released from the duty
of obedience in exchange for taking on the legal duty of participating equally
with the husband in the maintenance of the family. Through such reform, these
liberal feminist argue, women would begin to achieve formal equality with men
in the family; in other words, women earn equality by participation in the work
force.
Tunisian family law exemplifies this situation. The incorporation of liberal
feminist demands in the Tunisian Personal Status Majallah (Code) of 1956
represents for many Egyptian feminists (and many other feminists in the
Islamic world) the ideal to be pursued.195 However, there is a serious danger
implicit in the liberal feminist trade-off adopted by the Tunisian Majallah.
In 1993, Article 23 of the Tunisian Personal Status Majallah of 1956 was
amended. 196  The amendment seems to be a radical departure from its
194. This is due to the nature of the shari'ah, or Islamic law, which is believed to be, in essence,
not only perfect but completely obligatory, because it is divine law. Thus if reforms are presented as
representing the true Islamic or shari 'ah position on an issue, they will be difficult to critique or further
reform later on. This is a key reason why any changes or reform to Muslim family law are so
contentious to begin with. Professor Esposito's discussion of the nature of the shari'ah and ytihad is
instructive:
given the Muslim's divinely revealed vocation to submit to and realize God's will, groups of
jurists or legal scholars... sought to discover and delineate God's will for mankind in light
of the Quran and example of Muhammad [ijtihad]. As a result, Islamic law is as much a
system of ethics as it is law, for it is concerned with what the Muslim 'ought' or 'ought not'
to do. To violate the law is not only to risk legal sanctions on earth but divine judgment in
the hereafter because law in Islam is viewed as God-ordained, not man-made.
ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 21.
195. See Mounira Charrad, Repudiation versus Divorce: Responses to State Policy in Tunisia, in
WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND POLICY 51, 51 (Esther Ngan-ling Chow & Catherine White Berheide eds.,
1994). As the author reports,
[r]eform of family law in Tunisia constitutes an interesting case of intended and dramatic
innovation in the legal norms governing gender relations and family life. It is an example of
a government enacting a law as an instrument of social change in an Islamic country where
family matters had been regulated by traditional Islamic legal doctrine. Gaining significance
outside of Tunisia, the reforms became a model for advocates of women's rights elsewhere in
the Islamic world."
Id.
196. See Code, available at http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/csp/Csp2000.htm. See also
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reform of Personal Status Law in North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or
Mediterranean Law?, Women Living Under Islamic Law (WLUML), Occasional Paper No. 8, July
1966, at 12-13.
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predecessor, a serious liberalizing move on the part of the Tunisian legislature.
It signals an elaborate effort to abolish the legal command of obedience typical
of the Taqlid legal system in order to establish equality between the spouses.
The earlier version of Article 23 provided that:
The husband has to treat his wife well and avoid inflicting any harm on
her. He also has to maintain her and the children according to his
ability and her social status in all things included under his duty of
maintenance.
The wife may contribute to the family's maintenance if she has any
money.
The wife must care for the husband as the head of the family and obey
him in all those matters that are considered his rights as such.
The wife carries out her spousal duties according to custom.
197
The amended version of Article 23 provides that both spouses should avoid
inflicting harm on each other and should treat each other well; cooperate in
conducting the affairs of the family and in raising the children, including their
education, travel, and financial affairs; as well as carry out their spousal duties
according to custom. 198 The husband, as head of the family, must maintain the
wife and children according to his ability and their social status. 99 However,
the wife must contribute to the family's maintenance if she has money.200
The particular social/legal transaction required of Muslim women who
want to be part of a legal regime based on the formal equality of liberal
feminism, one that uses terms in its dicta such as "no spouse" or "both
spouses," is clear: participate in maintaining the family if you no longer want to
obey the husband.2 °' In other words, it seems that Tunisian elite have
conceived of the legal pathway to equality for women as requiring that their
money no longer be immune from the demands of their husband and children.
Thus, gender equality is conceived of as requiring an intervention in the Taqlid
legal conception of the family. The Tunisian path to liberal feminism, by
197. MAURICE BORRMANS, STATUS PERSONNEL ET FAMILLE AU MAGHREB DE 1940 A Nos JoUR
(PERSONAL STATUS AND FAMILY IN THE MAGHRIB FROM 1940 TO OUR DAY) 305 (1977).
198. See ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra note 162, at 183 (reporting that, "[diuring marriage, spouses
are to treat each other well, to fulfil their marital duties 'as required by custom and usage' and to
cooperate in running family affairs, including the upbringing of children.")
199. See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 28, at 243. The relevant section of Article 23 reads
as follows: "He [the husband] shall maintain her [the wife] and his children from her in accordance with
his circumstances and hers with regard to the matters generally involved in maintenance." Id. The
Article also specifically describes the husband as "being head of the family." Id.
200. See id. The relevant section of Article 23 reads as follows: "The wife shall participate in
supporting the family if she has money." Id.
201. The Status of Egyptian Women in Personal Status Law, in THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF




exposing women's purses to family demands in exchange for equality, typifies
the way liberal feminism has come to be articulated in its demands and goals
not only by Egyptian feminists, but also by most Arab feminists demanding
reform of their local Muslim laws.2°2
The political strategy adopted by these feminists is hostage to and accepts
uncritically the transactional logic explicit in the contemporary codified legal
regulation of the relationship between the spouses, itself the legacy of the
Taqlid legal system. According to this transactional logic, the wife owes her
husband obedience by virtue of his offer to her of wifely maintenance. 20 3 Thus,
feminists reason, take one and the other must go. The proposition of this
particular form of trade-off as the liberal feminist response to transactional
reciprocity looks, on its face, to be ignoring a very important social and
economic fact in the Islamic world. Women in fact "earn" their maintenance in
a way that is not recognized by the particular transactional legal formulation of
Islamic jurisprudence (obedience for maintenance). Women do housework and
in the vast majority of cases undertake childcare unaided by their spouses.
Submitting to the logic of the Taqlid transaction in one's political strategy to
reform it, in this manner, risks reinforcing the invisibility of this fact. It is a
formalist way of reforming which, if pursued, not only threatens to give little
gain to women, but also exposes them to loss of their property and earnings. It
is unfortunate that the Tunisian formulation in its amended form still insists that
spouses must complete their spousal duties according to custom.2°4 While
exposing their money to the family's maintenance needs in exchange for non-
obedience, the law still requires them to carry out their "spousal duty according
to custom" which, clearly, means that women will be doing the housework and
taking care of the children.
This interpretation is hard to avoid if one keeps in mind that the waged
employment rate for women in the Arab world is no more than, in the best of
cases, twelve percent of the population. 205 Most women are simply housewives
202. See id.
203. See supra note 28. See also SHAHAM, supra note 156, at 68 (reporting that, "[t]he
combination of a wife's right to maintenance from her husband and her duty to obey him reflects the
traditional gender roles in the patriarchal and patrilineal family.")
204. See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 28, at 243. The last sentence of Article 23 dictates
that the wife shall "fulfill her marital duties as required by custom and convention." Id.
205. See, e.g., HIJAB, supra note 30, at 10. Hijab reports that
[w]hile Arab women receive respect and encouragement when they are embarking on new
careers, there is some resistance to this becoming a permanent feature of Arab society, partly
because of the impact this would have on the family. Not only is the number of women
involved in the modem sector small, but there is one piece of information that stands out in
most of the writing on Arab women: the Arab region... appears to have the lowest women's
labour force participation rates (economically active women over 15 as a percentage of all
women over 15) of any region in the world.
Id. Hijab cites a 1980 report that estimated women's labor force participation in the Middle East to be
11.4 percent. See id. She asserts that the reason for the slow pace of incorporation of women in the
work force "is that so many different issues have to be resolved at one and the same time: the role of
women in society-whether they should be out at work as equal partners or stay at home to rear the
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or engage in agricultural work, while being expected to do housework.2 °6 The
social critique of the household division of labor between the spouses does not
seem to exist in a powerful way anywhere in the Islamic world. This is not the
case even among the elite or the intelligentsia. There is no escaping the fact, it
seems, that it is women who will be doing housework in Tunisia and that under
the amended law, they will not be compensated for it.
CONCLUSION
Substantive equality, as opposed to formal equality, should be the self-
conscious goal of feminist reform in the Islamic world.20 7  Achieving
substantive equality would require improving the daily bargaining position of
women vis-A-vis their spouses, rather than simply granting them the same
208powers and responsibilities as men. It may very well be that sometimes
family; the role of religion in society; the struggle for an independent political and economic identity
vis-hi-vis the rest of the world; and the establishment of a sound mode of development. These issues
have become inextricably tied together, and the attempt to solve them all at once is holding up the
resolution of any one of them." Id. at 11.
206. The Egyptian newspaper, AL-AHRAM, reported in a July 2001 article that
[a]ccording to Aliya El-Mahdi, professor of economics at Cairo University, in the absence of
a clear definition of what constitutes women's labour, and the variations in work patterns,
especially unofficial work, in rural and urban areas, it is very difficult to estimate accurately
the number of women or girls in the labour force. 'Women's work is usually invisible
because it takes place within the domestic sphere and, as a rule, household tasks defy
quantification and monetary valuation,' says El-Mahdi... There is a myth that says that
domestic chores performed by women have little or no economic value. The fact is, the work
performed by women has a high economic value but remains unmeasured and
unacknowledged,' El-Mahdi notes... In the rural areas, women's and girls' informal work
consists overwhelmingly of domestic tasks: caring for younger siblings, cooking, cleaning,
fetching fodder and fuel .... In the fields, women are involved in sowing, transplanting,
weeding, and harvesting. In the cities, female workers are responsible for their own
household tasks, and are also employed as domestic servants, peddlers (selling everything
vegetables to balloons, peanuts to bangles and newspapers), rag-pickers or beggars. Many
support other sectors of the economy through tedious and poorly paid home-based piece-rate
work.
Reem Leila, Anything But a Breeze: Women are Still Working-Harder Than Ever, It Seems, AL-
AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, July 12-18, 2001, at http:/iweekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/542,lil.htm. The
article cites Samir Radwan of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), who notes that, "the value of
women's informal work 'is neither counted in the Gross National Product (GNP) nor even generally
acknowledged as work."' Id. The author asserts, however, that, "their work makes a significant
economic and social contribution to their families, communities, and the nation." Id. The article also
reports that, "[a]ccording to the 1998 census, recently released by the Central Agency for Public
Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS), nearly two million women, aged between 30 and 49, work in the
informal sector. According to CAPMAS estimates, women support over 1.75 million families (21.5 per
cent of all Egyptian families) socially and financially. Most have been abandoned by their husbands, but
many are widowed or divorced." Id.
207. I mean by substantive equality that legal reform should seek to strengthen women's bargaining
power vis a vis their spouses, even though this might result in giving women powers and privileges that
are denied men. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
208. A discussion by Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol, a law professor in the United States bom
in Cuba, is instructive. Hemindez-Truyol explains that, "formal equality, the favored approach in the
early years of feminism, challenged classifications based on sex as perpetuating sex norms and
stereotypes. This approach urged adjudicators to reject laws that treated men and women differently,
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promoting the "sameness" of powers and responsibilities is indeed the way to
improve women's bargaining position. However, this situation may not always
be the case. Feminists' interlocutors should interrogate this position in a
manner that resists the magic and temptation of the discourse of "sameness as
equality."
One formulation in which legal reform may promote substantive equality
between spouses would be to hold that men maintain and women do not obey.
A way of achieving such formulation may be to preserve the legal transactional
logic of "maintenance for obedience," but to proceed to define the duty of
maintenance in a way that expands the husband's obligation towards his wife.
Such an expansive definition would seek to incorporate the idea that men are
compensating women for household labor. In the same manner, this reform
would redefine the duty of obedience on the part of the wife in a way that
would severely limit the requirements of "obedience," rendering the concept
practically meaningless. In addition, other rules would change to allow this
means for promoting substantive equality to be effective, particularly rules
regulating inheritance and divorce (and its financial consequences) for women.
thus eschewing any legal basis for distinguishing between the sexes based on traditionally assigned
roles. On the other hand, unlike the formal equality perspective, the dominance analytical approach
focuses on the inequality between the sexes, particularly the power differential between men and
women. Thus, in the context of sex, where men and women are (or may be) different-such as the
pregnancy conundrum--the goal of formal equality 'becomes a contradiction in terms, something of an
oxymoron."' Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol, Fdminismes san Fronti~res? The Cuban Challenge-
Women, Equality, and Culture, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER 81,
81-82 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000). The author, noting the many differences between Cuban
women's groups and Western feminism, reports that
[g]ender equality in the sense understood in Western feminism was never the goal of the
Cuban women's feminine movements. Rather, the focus was on pressing for and achieving
legal changes that would enable, encourage, and facilitate woman's natural role as, and
calling to be, a mother and wife, a nurturer. The grupos femeninos, with their marianista
model, were since their early days (and continue to be at present) unquestionably successful
movements-as the State's progressive laws attest.
Id. at 82. Thus, in Cuba, "[iln the twentieth century women benefited from the passage of progreisive
laws regarding property rights, divorce, maternity, and decriminalization of adultery. Significantly,
women obtained these broad rights without any acknowledgement of, aspiration for, or desire to attain
women's equality." Id. at 83.

